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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of confidentiality has always been of importance to 
any psychologist who provides direct clinical services to patients or 
clients. It is also one area of the mental health field which is 
undergoing some transformations and will continue to do so for some 
time in the future. Probably for most psychologists most of the time, 
confidentiality is a rather banal concept which, when incorporated 
intJ therapy, is pretty much forgotten a':>out and taken for granted. 
When the maintenance of confidentiality is called into question, how-
ever, it soon becomes a complex issut for which there are no easy 
solutions. 
Max Siegel, a recent president of the APA, highlighted a common 
ethical dilemma in the following story told in a recent interview: 
"'Max, this boy is dangerous,'" Siegel remembers the psychiatrist 
telling him. "'He has many, many homocidal tendencies in his 
dreams, his talks ... He threatens to get a gun as soon as he's old 
enough.'" His father had left home and he was transferring (onto) 
other men, to other authorities. "My reaction was that my col-
league had the makings of a good treatment case," Siegel recalls. 
"Work with this kid, help him, become his friend," I told him. 
"But the psychiatrist said that his ethical standards required him 
to tell his mother, and he called them both in and told her of her 
son's behavior. The mother slapped her son in front of the psy-
chiatrist and told him not to say such things. Of course they 
never returned to therapy, and we never knew what happened to 
1 
him." He paused, then added, "The boy was Lee Harvey Oswald" 
(Mervis, 1983, p.24). 
The zeitgeist which affects confidentiality is formed--by anum-
ber of interrelated forces and elements. Within our society there 
seem to be opposing forces, some of which push for more erosion of 
privacy, others which pull for the protection of the privacy of the 
individual. The trend is for more laws to be passed requiring that 
confidentiality be breached and privacy invaded, while at the same 
time more laws are passed mandating that confidentiality and privacy 
be preserved (Everstine, Everstine, Heyman, True, Frey, Johnson & 
Seiden, 1980). Une of the primary factors in recent years which has 
created a push for more privacy of the individual has been the Water-
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ga~e break-in. Many feel (Grossman, 1978; Payson, 1978; Siegel, 1979; 
Simon, 1978) that the break-in was a critical incident which spurred a 
curtailment of the invasJ.on of privacy on the part of the government. 
It displayed graphically the" ... outrageous intrusions upon the pri-
vacy of Americans in all walks of life .... The nation became aroused 
(by) the fundamental danger ... to the vital right of every American 
(i.e., rights to personal privacy)" (Siegel, 1979,p. 252). Shortly 
after Watergate, the Privacy Act of 1974 was passed which in turn 
spawned the creation of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, and 
task forces on privacy and confidentiality on the part of the American 
Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and 
the Orthopsychiatric Psychiatric Association. Siegel (1979) feels 
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that the very creation of these task forces and commissions was evi-
dence of the: 
mounting concern across the country about the apparent ~ollision 
course being travelled by those helping professions which adhere 
to the Hippocratic Oath (maintaining absolute confidentiality) and 
those who are caught up in the public's need and perhaps right to 
know (p. 252) 
There are other, opposing societal forces that push for the 
decrease in the privacy of information. There has been an increased 
interest in demanding accountability on the part of professionals. 
The public's disillusionment and loss of faith in many professions is 
felt to be a primary cause for this increased interest in accountabil-
ity (Michels, 1576; Naisbitt, 1982; Roston, 1975). Such disillusion-
ment may be a result of the public's disappointment with tho limita-
tions of science and reasoning in answering the problems of mankind 
(Michels, 1976) which Stone (1983) feels was exacerbated by several 
decades of the mental health professions promising more than they 
could deliver. Siegel (1979) fears that the pressure for more 
accountability on the part of psychotherapists is much more likely to 
threaten confidentiality than it is to enhance it. Peer review pro-
grams and insurance company reviews mean that more confidential infor-
mation will be shared not only with more professionals, but also with 
a wider range of supporting staff as well. In an impassioned, if not 
one-sided view of the impact of these societal trends on confidential-
ity and psychotherapy, Everstine et al. (1980) write that we: 
live in a nation in which and at a time when a)information pro-
cessing technology has escaped from ethical restraints, 
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b)governmental agencies have become too inquisitive about personal 
characteristics, thoughts, and actions; and c)radical means are 
being sought to identify and deter those who would commit violent 
acts against others. Buffeted by these winds of change, the-psy-
chotherapist trudges along, a lonely pilgrim (p. 831). ~ 
The push for accountability could be a positive trend in that it may 
promote the increased quality of care and thus prove to be ultimately 
beneficial to the psychotherapy recipient. Regardless of the position 
that one might take on this issue, however, the zeitgeist illuminates 
an inescapable burden or challenge which each individual therapist 
must face; it is the very conflict between the right to privacy of the 
individual receiving psychotherapy and the rights of others to kno\\· 
certain things aboJt that individual in order to protect society, to 
assure quality of care, or to warrant further treatment. No psycho-
therapist can eve~ escape from this fundamental dual responsibility. 
Many consider this dual responsibilty to be one of the most difficult 
of the ethical dilemmas for the mental heal~h professional (Karasu, 
1980; Lane & Spruill, 1980; Noll, 1974). The potential for conflict, 
confusion, apd uncertainty is high. It is therefore important to 
gather data from psychologists on how they think through these diffi-
cult issues in order to make their clinical decisions. 
The purpose of this research was to collect descriptive data and 
to test the effects of specific variables on how psychologists manage 
confidentiality during the course of psychotherapy. This was done 
through a survey of psychologists in seven states who provide psy-
chotherapy services. The survey asked the respondents about their 
various experiences and opinions about confidentiality, their knowl-
edge of various statutes and ethical guidelines, as well as how they 
thought through hypothetical situations in which the manage~ent of 
confidentiality could be a problem. 
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CHAPTER II 
-
HISTORY, THEORY, AND RESEARCH ON CONFIDENTIALITY 
Definition of Terms 
Before proceeding with a brief history of confidentiality in 
psychotherapy, it is important to define a number of terms which are 
critical in this research. The first term is privacy. The right to 
privacy is a constitutional guarantee and it refers to the freedom of 
individu3ls to choose for thr~mselves ~vhich of their beliefs, behav-
iors, and opinions are to b6 shared or withheld from others (Siegel, 
1979, p.251). 
Confidentiality is a concept originating in professional ethics 
which is an explicit or implicit promise to reveal nothingabout an 
individual except under certain conditions agreed to by that individ-
ual. More recently, confidentiality has become a legal term as well 
carrying with it a legally binding contract to not reveal private 
information under the threat of civil (Spiegel, 1979) or even criminal 
(Slovenko,1966) liability. Whenever the phrase "breach of confiden-
tiality" is used in this paper, it refers to a therapist sharing con-
fidential, identifying information about a patient to a third party 
without the patient's consent. 
6 
7 
Privileged communication is a legal term which guarantees that 
confidential information is protected from disclosure in a legal pro-
ceeding. In almost all states the privilege is granted so~ely to the 
individual (or recipient of services) not to the professional (DeKraai 
& Sales, 1982). Privilege is not a constitutional right, but a spe-
cific grant made to "individuals at risk" (Payson, 1978, p.134). 
Throughout this dissertation, the term "privilege status" will be used 
to refer to whether or not a psychologist has privileged communica-
tion. The way in which confidentiality and privileged communication 
are written into specific laws is determ1ned solely at the state 
level. The privileu~ statutes vary widPly from l:tate to f"tate and are 
modified by "exceptions" which have bee;.1 written into the statutes 
(DeKraai & Sales, 1982). Some of the more common exceptions encoun-
tered include: 
Future crime exception: generally this m3ans that either a con-
fidential or privileged relationship can be made non-confidential 
whenever it appears that the client is likely to commit a crime. 
Within mental health, this is frequently referred to as a "dangerous 
patient exception." 
Judicial discretion exception: If a client is involved in a 
legal proceeding, a judge can decide that in the interest of justice, 
the need to know outweighs the need to maintain confidentiality, and 
the relationship then ceases to remain confidential. For all practi-
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cal purposes, the inclusion of such an exception negates any existing 
privilege statute (Nye, 1983). This exception is in place in the men-
tal health laws of five states (DeKraai & Sales, 1982). 
Patient-litigant exception: this is a general exception which 
says that a confidential relationship may cease to be confidential 
whenever a client is involved in a legal proceeding. It is more gen-
eral than the judicial discretion exception because anyone in the 
legal proceeding (lawyers, etc.) can request that confidential infor-
mation be revealed. 
History 
Virtually every historian of professional ethics traces the 
s~art of confidentiality to the Hippocra~ic Oath (Schuchman, 1980; 
Slovenko, 1966). which states: 
Whatsoever I shall see or hear in ~~e course of my profession in 
my intercourse with men, if it be what should not be published 
abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be secrets. 
The original Hippocratic oath spoke to the need for absolute confiden-
tiality. As a result of many social currents and forces, particularly 
during the past 100 years, this code has undergone a modern transla-
tion which has been included in the AMA code of ethics (American Psy-
chiatric Asso~iation, 1968). The translation reads: 
A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the 
course of his medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may 
observe in the character of his patients, unless he is required to 
do so by law, or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect 
the welfare of the community. 
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A shift from absolute confidentiality to a position of "relative con-
fidentiality" is made evident by this modern translation. Some of the 
historical markers which may have played a role in such a ~hift will 
be reviewed. 
The first legislation to protect the confidentiality of a help-
ing profession (outside the legal profession) was passed in New York 
State in 1828 granting privilege to physicians. There were no excep-
tions to the privilege (Dubey, 1974). The purpose of the privilege 
was to encourage patients to seek medical treatment particularly when 
they might have a contagious disease with a social stigma attached to 
it. It was reasoned that if the patien;:'s privacy could be muin-
tained, thereby sparing him shame and embarrassment, he then would be 
more willing to seek treatment. During the years that followed the 
passage of this New York statute, other states adopted similar stat-
utes, adding modifications or exceptions. Soon, the conditions under 
which privilege applied and when it did not became a complex matter 
(Slovenko, 1Y66). 
Wigmore's (1940) classic treatise, Evidence, has been a major 
influence on the legal profession's view of privileged relationships. 
He outlined four conditions which should be satisfied in order to war-
rant the establishment of a privileged relationship. These conditions 
have been recognized as the standard by which decisions are made about 
the privileged status of professional relationships. They are: 
1. Does the communication in the given professional relationship 
originate in a confidence that it will not be disclosed? 
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2.Is the inviolabilty of that confidence essential to the achieve-
ment of the purpose of the relationship? 
3. Is the relationship one that should be fostered? 
4. Is the expected injury to the relationship, through the fear of 
later disclosure, greater than the expected benefit to justice in 
obtaining the testimony? 
The justification for a physician-patient privilege came under 
heavy criticism based on Wigmore's four criteria. Wigmore himself 
attacked the medical privilege on the basis that the medical condition 
of most patients could not only be disclosed without shame, but was 
frequently known by the public anyway. Wigmore argued that the guar-
antee of privileged communication is 11sually not necessary in order to 
pursuade persons to seek medical help. He further stateL that the 
injury to the physician- patient relationship by disclos~re is not 
greater than the social benefit to be gained by having physician's 
testimony at litigation where it seems appropr~.ate. 
The development of medical privilege has served as the precedent 
upon which d~cisions have been made about the worthiness of a privi-
lege for psychotherapists. This precedent had been in place for a 
number of years because as Slovenko (1966) points out, law is conser-
vative; it attempts to regulate behavior by general principles and 
does so by referring to knowledge developed in other fields. Thus, if 
history serves as a precedent, as mental health professionals become 
successful in achieving privilege status, then undoubtedly there will 
be attempts to limit the scope of that privilege. 
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In 1952, a case was heard in Illinois in which the need to 
establish unique privileged communication for the practice of psychia-
try was tested (Slawson, 1969). A husband was bringing a claim 
against his wife and trying to use the fact that she was receiving 
psychiatric treatment as evidence against her. The treating psychia-
trist who was subpoenaed in this case refused to testify on the 
grounds that such communications should be protected. The psychia-
trist was taking a calculated risk since there was no statute granting 
such a privilege. The judge agreed with the psychiatrist. The ruling 
was not appealed, and in 1959 Illinois passed a privileged communica-
tion statute for psychiatrists. In 1960, model legislati1m known as 
the GAP (Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry) Proposa~- recommended 
that Connecticut establish a psychiatrist-patient privilege (Goldstein 
& Katz, 1962). The thrust of their argument was that the psychiatrist 
urges the client to discuss problems, such as the possibility of some 
future dangerous behavior ... "on the assumption that less harm will 
insue if (fe~lings are) ventilated than if (they are) suppressed" (p. 
736). such a privilege was granted in Connecticut based on Wigmore's 
four points. Georgia also passed a similar statute at this time. 
Initially; privilege was extended only to physician-patient or 
psychiatrist-patient relationships. The psychology profession, still 
"new-comers" to the field of psychotherapy, was relatively less organ-
ized regarding privilege in psychotherapy. In time, however, others 
began to argue that Wigmore's four criteria are met in the case of the 
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psychotherapist- patient relationship (Diamond & Weihofen, 1953; Loui-
sell, 1956; Rappaport, 1963; Zenoff, 1962). Slovenko (1966) argues 
that the general public assumes that communications to a psychiatrist 
(psychotherapist) are confidential, and that the very essence of psy-
chotherapy is to discuss confidential personal matters which the 
patient is normally reluctant to discuss. Out of the 41 states and 
Canadian provinces granting privilege for the treatment of psychiatic 
patients (as of 1967), 32 granted the privilege with specific refer-
ence to the psychologist-client relationship, and used the attorney-
client model (APA, 1967). By 1969, 41 of the 50 states offered some 
type of privilege (Slm.,rson, _ 969). 
Throughout the time that these statutes were being created and 
discussed in the state legislatures, there were rtumerous attempts by 
different groups to thwart the successful passage of privilege stat-
utes. The legal profession has had a long and vigorous opposition to 
the creation of any privilege statutes other than those granted to 
lawyers (Chafee, 1943). Before the U.S. Code of Evidence (proposed by 
the U.S. supreme court in 1969) was sent to congress for approval, 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege (Rule 504) was added because 
there seemed to be a constitutional basis for it. However, the AMA 
and the ABA (American Bar Association) recommended action to eliminate 
Rule 504 from the code. It was largely due to this protest that the 
bill was never passed and the congress left the matter for the state 
legislatures to discuss (Grossman, 1978). More recently, the ABA 
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opposed the psychotherapist-patient privilege bill proposed in New 
York State and this was felt to undoubtedly have influenced the deci-
sion of Govenor Carey to veto the bill in 1975 (Grossman, ~978, 
p.145). To this day New York has a judicial discretion exception in 
their statute which all but effectively eliminates the privilege. 
Grossman (1978) attributes this state of affairs to the strong lobby-
ing by the ABA in that state. At the present time six states includ-
ing New York have this judicial discretion exception (DeKraai & Sales, 
1982). 
The legal profession's argument against a privilege for psycho-
therapists is that no substantial evidence exists suggesting that the 
treatment of patients is actually hindered in states without privi-
leged communication. They suggest that this might b~ so because the 
patients probably do not know that they do not have privileged commu-
nication (Yale Law Journal, 1962). One might wond~r, ho~ever, whether 
a psychologist's knowledge of whether of not he/she has privileged 
communication is reflected in the treatment process thereby affecting 
the patient. It is clear that the effects of the presence or absence 
of privilege have not been studied very thoroughly; therefore, it 
would be of importance to investigate what effect the presence or 
absence or prvileged communication has on patients or therapists. It 
would first be important to find out if psychologists know what the 
term "privileged communication" means, and whether or not they know if 
they have privilege in their respective states of practice. 
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The Tarasoff Decision 
Probably no event has had more of an impact on the management of 
confidentiality in psychotherapy than the Tarasoff case in California. 
Because it was such a landmark case, it \vill be explored more fully 
here in the hope that some of the effects of this decision can be 
evaluated in the proposed research. Although the actual account of 
what happened in the Tarasoff case has been reported in numerous arti-
cles (Bersoff, 1976; Fleming & Maximov, 1974; Gurevitz, 1977; Karasu, 
1980; Lane & Spruill, 1980; Oldham, 1978; Paul, 1977; Roth & Meisel, 
1977; Siegel, 1979; Stone, 1984) as well as in the original court 
recordings (Tarasoff vs. the Regents of the University of California, 
1974), the best summary of the c~se is found in an article by Grossman 
(1978) and will be presented hure: 
The story as it unfolds in the introdt:ction of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's first decision of December 23, 1974, begins 
with a patient, Prosenjit Poddar, (who was) receiving outpatient 
psychoth~rapy at the Cowell Memorial Hospital of the University of 
California at Berkeley. The date on which he began therapy was 
not available to the court. On August 20, 1969, Poddar's thera-
pist determined that Poddar, in his threats to kill Tatiana Tara-
soff, had become a great enough risk to warrant starting proceed-
ings for involuntary hospitalization and did so. At the time, 
Tatiana was visiting Brazil for the summer and did not return for 
approximately two months. In accordance with L.P.S. 1 procedure, 
~ L.P.S. or the Lanterman-Petris Short Act is a civil commitment 
statute in California which outlines treatment of the mentally ill 
and protection of their individual liberties while also protecting 
society. This act made civil commitment more difficult to initi-
ate and to prolong. Indeed under this act the psychiatrists at 
the student health facility did not have the authority to confine 
Poddar on the basis of their judgement that he was dangerous and 
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the therapist, Dr. Moore, applied to the campus police to take 
Poddar into custody pending the issuance of a 72-hour hold for 
observation, also in accordance with L.P.S .... L.P.S. dictates that 
the party to whom application is made must determine independently 
that the patient presents evidence of being dangerous. _The police 
did take Poddar into custody, decided he was not dangerous, and 
freed him with a warning to stay away from Tatiana. A complica-
tion, clouding the issue further, was the absence of the director 
of the clinic at the time; on his return days later he demanded 
that all records of the attempt to secure involuntary hospitaliza-
tion be destroyed. (Not in the record are two factors that may be 
involved. First, the University had previously been sued for 
imprisonment following a successful attempt for commitment. Sec-
ond, openly known and widely reported in local newspapers was an 
ongoing feud between the director and the therapy staff.) As 
might have been expected, Poddar thereafter refused to return for 
further therapy. 
Nowhere in the court's decision is there any linkage between 
these factors although all are taken up individually. Even Judge 
!losk in his forceful criticism of the majority's reasoning, in his 
concurrence of ordering the case to trial, bases his concurrence 
on the "fact" that Poddar was planning to kill ... Tatiana." And he 
concurred in the majority's major determination that there is a 
du~y to warn under Tarasoff conditions. 
Ta~iana did not return home until October 1969. In the 
two-month interval Poddar was free, (he) caused no problems, 
showed no evidence of violence, and in fact became a roommate of 
Tatiana's brother. We must assume he voiced no threat against 
Tatiana rluring this time, otherwise it would have constituted a 
warning.· On October 27, 1969, shortly after Tatiana's return, 
Poddar killed her. Apparently the plaintiff's statements seeking 
damages went into inflammatory detail of the violence, giving the 
multiple number of stabbings and shooting. 
Tatiana's parents sued the psychologist treating Poddar, Dr. 
Moore, the physicians with whom the latter consulted for seeking 
the involuntary hospitalization, the police who failed to carry 
through with the custody proceedings, the director of the clinic, 
and primarily the Regents of the University of California who 
employed all the others. The suit was on four grounds of causing 
or contributing to the wrongful death of their daughter. The 
mentally ill (Stone, 1984) 
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lower courts dimissed the action outright on the basis of immunity 
for the multiple defendants and the psychotherapist's need to pre-
serve confidentiality. 
On appeal, The California Supreme Court agreed with the 
lower courts on all counts except one entered by the plaintiffs as 
the second of the four causes of action: failure to warn Tatia-
na's family of the danger since they (the staff) knew that Poddar 
was at large and dangerous. In dismissing the need for confiden-
tiality, the summmation of the court's argument rests in one sen-
tence: "The protective privilege ends where the public peril 
begins." It is interesting to note that this sentence in the 
original December 23, 1974 decision is repeated verbatim in the 
July 1, 1976 post-rehearing decision, and has proven a catch-
phrase used as a precedent in country-wide hearings after the 
original order was made to return the case to the lower court for 
trial (p156-158). 
The initial Tarasoff decision established that psychotherapists 
or tr.e police have a duty to warn, not a duty to commit (Stone, 1984). 
During the appeal, the court abandoned its position on the liability 
of t~e police stating that the police did not have a special relation-
ship to the uefendant and thus did not have a duty to warn. This 
illogical decision (Donelly, 1978; Stone, 1984) is ironic because as 
Stone (1984).points out, if anyone " ... behaved improperly it was the 
police who made an independent judgment about the likelihood of Pod-
dar's violence and his sanity and rejected the judgment of the clinic" 
(p.162) that he was dangerous and mentally ill. Stone asks: "Can 
courts claim to be protecting the public when they assign police 
duties to psychotherapists and absolve the police of those same 
duties?" (1984, p.174). 
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Before the final ruling was made on appeal, the Tarasoff family 
settled their claim out of court, thus it remains uncertain whether or 
not a judge or jury would have found the defendants negligent (Stone, 
1984). The events during both Tarasoff hearings, however, lead one to 
speculate that any ruling would have been in the Tarasoffs' favor. 
Reviewers of the Tarasoff decision(s) (Grossman, 1978; Stone, 1984) 
point out that an article by Fleming and Maximov (1974) which appeared 
in a law journal heavily influenced the courts. The article contained 
many references to Thomas Szasz who has maintained a decidedly anti-
commitment position in psychiatry. From this influence, Fleming and 
Maximov tried to solve the therapist's dilemma of responsibilitY" 
towards both society and the individual patient by saying that the 
therapist should protect soc.iety in a way which is least harmful to 
the patient (which from the Szasz influence means least restrictive 
and avoiding containment). Fleming and Maximov reasoned then that the 
duty to protect society should take the form of a duty to warn poten-
tial victims> not a duty to commit. As Stone (1984) points out, Flem-
ing and Maximov in no way considered that such a warning does not pro-
tect society as much as would confining the patient. They made the 
judgement that the breach of confidentiality by warning a third party 
is far preferable, less abusive and harmful to the patient than con-
fining him. This, however, is only one of many ways of managing the 
dangerous patient (Roth & Miesel, 1977). 
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Psychiatry or psychology as an organized body were not offi-
cially involved before a settlement was made. It was felt to be."too 
messy a controversy" to become involved in (Gurevitz, 1978 }"-because it 
was coupled with an embroiled internal controversy among the personnel 
of the Student Health Center. After the settlement was made which 
found the defendants liable,however, the Northern California Psychiat-
ric Society prepared an amicus curiae brief. They criticized the 
Tarasoff decision on many points, one of which is that dangerousness 
is difficult to predict and therefore the defendants should be 
absolved of any liability in thjs case. While it is true that danger-
ousness is difficult to predict, there i3 a diiference of opinion 
about the importance of this fact in the cas\3. A major counter-po __ nt 
was that the prediction issue was a moot point since the clinical 
decision was made that Poddar was dangerous; therefore, the issue was 
then one of how the case was managed once the da.ngerousn·~ss was estab-
lished (Oldham, 1978; Paul, 1977). Thus, it was not the breach in 
confidential~ty per se whch ~vas problematic, but rather it was the 
"bungled" attempt at restraint by Dr. Moore and the police combined 
with the inconsistent attitude on the part of the Student Health Cen-
ter (as shown in the director's decision to destroy the records) which 
caused Poddar to terminate treatment (Gurevitz, 1977). The court how-
ever did not consider this to be an issue. The court stated that 
there is a duty to break confidentiality where danger to society 
demands it in order to prevent a dangerous act from occurring. Influ-
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enced by Fleming and Maximov's article, the courts made a questionable 
inference leap (Grossman, 1978) by equating "protection of society" 
with "warning a supposed victim." Furthermore, the courts d-id not dif-
ferentiate bewteen a "viable, uncontestably present danger" (Grossman, 
1978,p. 161) such as a washed out bridge or an uncovered manhole on a 
busy sidewalk, and a possible threat which might become a danger and 
thus is not truly forseeable (Grossman, 1978, p. 161). The courts 
overlooked the fact that the possible (as opposed to uncontestably 
present) danger could have been decreased by not disclosing and simply 
pursuing further treatment (amicus curiae brief). 
Stone (1984) points out the increased conilict which occurred 
when Tarasoff established the distinction between a duty to warn and a 
duty to commit: 
In essence, originally asked to choose between a duty to warn and 
a duty to confine, the court opted for a third and more ambiguous 
choice, a duty to protect. Thus they avoid~ct taking a position 
that would seem to favor civil commitment. But as a result, Tara-
soff I! set a much more ambiguous precedent than did Tarasoff l -
an ambig:lity that would allow ingenious lawyers to claim negli-
gence whenever a patient who has seen a psychotherapist subse-
quently harms a third party. The central ambiguity of Tarasoff II 
is that it tells the psychotherapist that he or she must protect 
third parties, but does not specify what steps are legally neces-
sary and sufficient to meet this obligation to protect the public. 
Gurevitz (1977) fears that the decision reinforces a social con-
trol function for psychiatry. Stone (1984) feels that the effect on 
psychotherapists of the Tarasoff decisions is to leave therapists with 
a high degree of confusion about what the actual duty is and what the 
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limits are of that duty. This could create any number of possible con-
sequences. It could mean a lower level of safety for society as_psy-
chotherapists avoid dangerous patients in order to avoid liability. 
Another possibility is that in an attempt to carry out this duty to 
warn, there will be many futile warnings (Bersoff, 1976; Roth, 1983) 
and "increased revolving-door civil commitments" (Stone, 1984, p. 
175). This in turn may also have the effect of patients leaving 
treatment precipitously thereby potentially increasing the risk of a 
future dangerous act. 
Fleming and Maximov (1974) feel that as a result of Tarasoff, 
therapists will have a duty t,, advise patients from the outset of 
therapy about the obligation to warn potential victims under Tarasoff 
conditions. The literature, ho~.;rever, suggests that there is disagree-
ment about how therapists feel about the Tarasoff decision. Wexler 
(1981) found that many therapi.8ts believe that the exclusive one-to-
one therapy model is outdated and ignores the reality of the backdrop 
against which therapy takes place (i.e., with auxiliary office staff 
and insurance companies having access to the content of the therapy). 
Some therapists embrace the duty to warn because it gives them a pol-
icy of what to do in a difficult clinical situation and makes it eas-
ier for them to bring up difficult issues with a patient when it is 
required of them to do so (Wexler, 1981). But there is a difference 
of opinion about whether or not to inform from the outset of treatment 
about the limits to confidentiality under Tarasoff conditions (Beck, 
1982). 
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The idea that there might be something positive or therapeutic 
to a breach of confidentiality is shared by other clinicians who work 
with potentially violent patients: 
The general public, prosepctive patients, and patients in therapy 
will not lose faith in the psychiatrist as a keeper of secrets 
when, in case of emergency, he acts contrary to strict and abso-
lute confidentiality. Sooner or later, the patient usually real-
izes that the psychiatrist has acted in his (the patient's) best 
interest (Slovenko, 1966, p.56). 
Roth and Miesel (1977) address the issue of the therapist's dual 
responsibility to protect the individual and society. They recognize 
that when faced with a potentially violent or self de3tructive 
patient, a clinician has typically had several conventional options at 
his disposal, each of which place a different weight upon the "compet-
ing values of confidentiality and the protection of social order" 
(p.508). Those options include: ~oluntary or involuntary hospitaliza-
tion, notification of potential victims, calling the police, or con-
tinued therapeutic management of the patient without taking any of 
these other measures. Roth and Meisel have modified these options and 
made recommended guidelines for the management of dangerous patients 
which aim to help protect the rights of both the individual and soci-
ety. They suggest the following: 1) since actual violence is rela-
tively rare, especially among those with no history of previous vio-
lence, it is better to rely on the odds and not warn. They add that 
therapists must not be "stampeded" into providing frequent warnings to 
third parties because of Tarasoff, particularly when in most cases, it 
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is just not warranted 2) even when danger seems imminent, the 
either/or dichotomy of protecting the individual or society can be 
softened by making the patient an active participant in helping to 
avert a violent or self destructive episode. The patient might be 
encouraged to phone the intended victim himself with the therapist's 
help and explain briefly what circumstance he is in. Family members 
can be used as sources of support or brought into therapy themselves 
to diffuse the "identified patient" type of pressure. Their assis-
tance can also be used to help rid the patient's residence of lethal 
weapons. 
Siegel demonstrated a similar 1~ind of modified techn~que (or 
balancing act) in the following case from his private practice: 
A teenager set a bomb in the automobile of a dean, at whom 
he was angry. When I could not convince this youngster to disman-
tle the bomb voluntarily, I left my office, went a mile up the 
road, phoned the police from a public phone, (and) phoned the 
school from a public phone. I in no way incriminated the boy. 
The police dismantled it, nobody was hurt, and the boy 
trusted me. And he came back. There were good results later on: 
we were able to deal with his anger (Mervis, 1983, p.24). 
Here, both the individual therapy relationship and the safety of soci-
ety were preserved. Roth and Meisel reiterate Siegel's guiding prin-
ciple in that a therapist's action should always be assessed in terms 
of how likely the therapeutic manuever is to prevent the violent act, 
but also what its effect might be on the future of the treatment rela-
tionship. 
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A final guideline suggested by Roth and Meisel is that of 
informed consent. They recommend that a therapist should inform_his 
patient of the confidential nature of the therapy relationship, being 
sure to warn of the limits of confidentiality. Yet they also acknowl-
edge that despite the virtues of informed consent, such a detailed 
explanation of the limits of confidentiality may deter some patients 
from seeking psychotherapy. They seem to be suggesting that sometimes 
it is recommended that the limits of confidentiality not be mentioned 
in advance, but only stated when a patient begins to "speak convinc-
ingly of potential violence" (p.510). What they seem to be saying is 
that if it seems reasonable, inform yovr clitnts of the limits of con-
fidentiality from the outset. If, however, you have a feeling tLat 
such a detailed explanation would deter them, then do not offer cne 
until it really becomes necessary. 
This stance is decidedly different from that taken by others 
(Nye, 1983; Bersoff, 1976) who firmly believe that all patients should 
be told everything up front from the start. They feel it is better to 
have some patients deterred from seeking help rather than have some 
patients in treatment without being fully informed of the parameters 
of the relationship. 
Wise (1978) conducted a survey of mental health professionals in 
California in order to assess the effects of the Tarasoff decision on 
their clinical practices. Primarily psychiatrists of a psychoanalytic 
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orientation responded to the survey. When asked to speculate about 
their clients' responses to confidentiality, 86.3% of the respondents 
thought that their patients assumed that what was said in therapy was 
absolutely confidential. In addition, 79% of the clinicians felt that 
patients would be less likely to divulge certain information once the 
patient becomes aware that the therapist may have to divulge it to 
someone else. When asked about the importance of confidentiality, 
69.7% of the therapists thought that confidentiality was important but 
could be breached under certain circumstances, while 26% thought that 
confidentiality was essential and should never be breached under any 
circumstances. Twenty-five 11ercent of the respordents said that <:hey 
have had patients who have terminated prematurelJ because they feared 
a breach of confidentiality. It is not known if these were the same 
respondents who felt that confidentiality should never be breachc~ 
under any circumstance. Sixty three p~rcent would diEcuss confiden-
tiality only as it occurred naturally during the course of therapy. 
Only 14.5% i~dicated that they would discuss the issue from the outset 
of therapy. Since these data are based largely on a survey of psychi-
atrists, it would be interesting to see if psychologists handle confi-
dentiality in a similar fashion. If so, this would certainly be at 
odds with the recommendations in the specialty guidelines to mention 
confidentiality and its limits from the outset of therapy, and to com-
ply with all local, state, and federal laws. 
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Wise (1978) obtained the following results in response to direct 
questions about the impact of the Tarasoff decision on their clinical 
behavior: twenty percent reported discussing confidentialLty more 
frequently with their clients since Tarasoff while 32.9% reported that 
they consulted with colleagues with greater frequency when treating 
potentially dangerous clients. Respondents noted changes in the way 
in which they felt when clients brought up the_issue of their paten-
tially dangerous behavior. Fifty-four percent of the clinicians felt 
increased anxiety when the topic came up, and 55.7% reported an 
increased fear of law suits when clients mentioned their dangerous 
behavior. The author noted that: 
If the therapists' apparent preference for not discussing the 
issue of confidentiality with their patients reflects a clinical 
principle that patients make more complete disclosures of informa-
tion crucial to successful treatment when the patients remain 
ignorant of possible breaches of confidenti~lity, then Tarasoff 
may harm therapy by removing the illusion of absolute confiden-
tiality (Wise, 1978, p.l84). 
The Tarasoff case appears to have left clinicians with much con-
fusion about how to handle confidentiality when a patient is threaten-
ing harm. This confusion is also reflected in the various ethical 
guidelines of the American Psychological Association. In 1981, spe-
cialty guidelines for a number of psychological specialities were 
drafted and published by the APA (198la). The specialty guidelines 
for both clinical and counseling psychologists have a quasi-legal, 
contractual tone . They were designed to clarify and reconfirm many of 
the aspects of the generic "Standards for Providers of Psychological 
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Services." Some of the recommended behaviors in these guidelines 
include: 
All providers within a psychological service unit suppQrt the 
legal and civil rights of the users.... All providers within a 
psychological service unit are familiar with and adhere to all of 
the APA official policy statements (e.g., the Ethical Principles, 
the Specialty Guidelines, etc.) .... All providers within a clini-
cal (counseling) psychological service unit conform to relevant 
statutes established by federal, state, and local governments 
(p.645). 
Among some of the additional, specific behaviors recommended in the 
specialty guidelines are: encouraging psychologists to be prepared to 
provide a statement of procedural guidelines, statement of current 
methods, forms, procedures, and techniques to be used, and to develop 
a written treatment plan. !n addition, the guidelines recommend that 
users be informed in advance of any limits in the setting for mainte-
nance of canfidentiality of clinical information. 
By contra>t, the guidelines in the Ethical Principles of Psy-
chologists (APA, 1981b) are less specific in the behaviors which are 
recommended. Principle 5: Confidentiality of the 1981 edition of the 
Ethical Principles states: "Where appropriate, psychologists inform 
their clients of the limits of confidentiality" (p.636). Clearly this 
latter guideline leaves the psychologist with more freedom and respon-
sibility than the specialty guidelines to decide when it is prudent to 
inform a client in advance of any limits of confidentiality. 
The specialty guidelines emphasize that psychologists support 
the legal and civil rights of the users. When examined more care-
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fully, this is a confusing guideline. "Users" have already been 
defined as "direct recipients of psychological services, family ~em­
bers, and third party payers such as insurance carriers. What does a 
psychologist do when these "users" are in conflict? To whom does he 
owe his primary allegiance? What is the most effective way to support 
the rights of a client? Might some clients be more willing to dis-
close and thus better treated when not informed of the limits of con-
fidentiality from the outset of therapy? While these guidelines are 
in a state of "flux," the individual practitioner must decide how to 
handle these Pthical dilemmas. Many factors, of course, may influence 
tl•E> individual practitioner's decisions in this regard. Factors 
related to dangerousness of the client and the Tarasoff decision have 
already been discussed. Other factors such as the practitioner's 
k:'owledge and experience, and theoretical orientation have received 
little attention in the literature. There are, however, theoretical 
writings which offer some insight into the possible impact that theo-
retical orientation may have on the practitioner's approach to confi-
dentiality. 
Theoretical Views on Confidentiality 
Theoreticians on confidentiality in psychotherapy tend to main-
tain one of two positions: those who advocate the need for complete, 
absolute confidentiality, and those who feel that relative confiden-
tiality is more appropriate, allowing for confidentiality to be 
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breached under certain circumstances. Nowhere in the literature were 
there writers who felt that confidentiality was unimportant in psy-
chotherapy. 
Slawson (1969) advocated absolute confidentiality except for 
those who raise the issues of mental illness as a defense in court. 
Of those who advocate a position of absolute confidentiality, many are 
psychodynamic clinicians (Donnelly, 1978). Robert Langs (1976) places 
a heavy emphasis on the establishment and maintenance of a therapeutic 
frame which is the structure in which psychotherapy takes place. It 
consists of a set of conditions which help the patient to feel safe 
enough to take the necessary risks to explore his psychic life. L~ngs 
maintains that the" ... exclusive one-to-one relationship with total 
confidentiality is the core of the therapeutic alliance and as basic 
as the analyst' objectivity" (p.303). He equates any non-confidential 
aspect of the therapy as fostering a misalliance which tends to influ-
ence all aspects of the therapeutic work. He refers to any deviation 
from total confidentiality as a ''basic impairmeni in the therapeutic 
quality of the (bipersonal) field" (p.277). Langs argues that 
patients are exquistively sensitive to the least modification in the 
therapeutic frame. Any modification is experienced by the patient as 
aggression which then fosters mistrust and is a reflection on the 
therapist's poor control and incompetence. 
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Nany of the psychodynamic writers who believe in absolute confi-
dentiality base their positions on the theoretical concept of the 
holding environment (Winnicott, 1965) in which the therapi~t fosters a 
feeling of safety by serving as the container of a patient's impulses, 
fantasies, hostilities, etc. Kubie (1950) described therapy as a pro-
cess in which a patient slowly allows his "secret self" to emerge. He 
made the analogy that the therapist is a "safe deposit box to which 
the patient alone has the key." Playing the role of this safe reposi-
tory is part and parcel of maintaining the therapeutic framework and 
holding environment. Only when the therapist succeeds in maintaining 
the safe repository can this final "secret self" emerg~. Kubie seems 
to be saying that a therapist must provide "air-tight" containment 
because any confidentiality '"leaks" will seriously co!'1promise the 
therapy. 
Greenacre (1954) who is also a psychoanalyst, feels that both 
the maintenance of confidentiality and the limitation of the relation-
ship to a professional one are the key ingredients to therapeutic 
work. While acknowledging the difficulty in maintaining confidential-
ity, Greenacre recommended that it is best to give out information 
only with the patient's consent and knowledge. Neither Langs nor 
Greenacre discuss the handling of emergency situations. 
Otto Kernberg, a well-known psychodynamic theoretician, sug-
gested a modified stance on confidentiality when working with border-
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line inpatients (1975). Citing a bordeline's tendency to pit one 
staff member against another (which he refers to as "splitting" staff 
members), he recommended that clinicians broaden the theraReutic frame 
in order to include other staff members so that the splitting can be 
prevented. While this does not constitute a breach of confidential-
ity, it does represent a modification of the absolute stance that 
information never leave the therapist-patient dyad. Karasu (1980) 
made a much stronger statement when he said that 
(psycho)dynamic psychotherapists so strongly believe in utmost 
confidentiality and individual privacy of the dyadic relationship 
that they fail to divulge certain confidences or share information 
with family members that may prove vital to the welfare of the 
patient. (p 1507). 
Little is known about how theorists from other theoretical ori-
entations view confidentiality. Might other orientations also favor 
such absolute confidentiality? Appelbaum (1978) criticizes those who 
take an absolute stance about the maintenance of confidentiality. In 
a cogent, succinct argument he says "little can be said about psycho-
therapeutic techniques the opposite of which is also not true under 
some circumstances" (p. 220). \vhile Appelbaum agrees that in most 
cases it would be better to maintain confidentiality, he does not 
believe that the therapeutic relationship is irreparrably harmed when 
confidentiality is breached. In fact, he, like Roth and Miesel(1977), 
feels that something positive can come out of learning to cope with 
the imperfections in a treatment relationship. 
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The clinical literature suggests that there is considerable 
variability among individual practitioners and theorists regarding how 
confidentiality should be managed. A recent president of ~he APA 
(Siegel, 1979) as well as many other psychologists (particularly those 
with psychodynamic orientations) believe that confidentiality be abso-
lute even when a client threatens harm to others (Goldstein & Katz, 
1962; Kubie, 1950; Langs, 1976; Nariner, 1967; Uchill, 1978). Others, 
while also arguing for the importance of confidentiality, believe that 
confidentiality should be relative, allowing for exceptions to be made 
particularly in emergency situations (Appelbaum, 1978; Fromm-Re:chman, 
1950; GrcenacrE, 1954; Karasu, 1980; Kernberg, 1975 Menninger, 1958). 
There is at least the suggestion f:;:om the clinical v.Titings that theo-
retical orientation may play a role ir;. how confidentiality is managed 
in psychotherapy, with psychodynamic clinicians opt.ing for a position 
closer to absolute confidentiality than those clinicians of other ori-
entations. 
Empirical Research on Confidentiality 
The majority of empirical studies on confidentiality have 
involved surveys of mental health professionals which fall roughly 
into three categories: (!)surveys which seek to determine how aware 
psychotherapists are of their various legal statutes and ethical 
guidelines, (2)surveys which examine the attitudes and behaviors of 
therapists in their management of clinical issues as they relate to 
32 
confidentiality and privileged communication, and (3) surveys involv-
ing the study of mental health professionals' practice of sharing con-
fidential information with other institutions or colleaguea~ 
The two published surveys of the first type, those seeking to 
test how aware therapists are of their ethical guidelines and legal 
statutes, provide evidence for mental health professionals' confusion 
and lack of information about state laws. Suarez and Balcanoff (1966) 
found that nearly one fourth of the psychiatrists they surveyed in 
Massachusetts were unaware that there was no privileged communication 
statute in their state of practice. Swoboda, Elwork, Sales, and Lev-
ine (1978) fouui that nearly one third of the psychologists and one 
fourth of the respondents overall were not familiar with their privi-
leged commuLication statutes in the state of Nebraska. 
Suarez and Balcanoif (1966) also gathered data about psychia-
trists' opinion of desirable exceptions to privilege. Only 5% of the 
respondents felt that a privilege statute was not necessary. The 
majority of psychiatrists felt that there should be exceptions to 
privilege in only 3 conditions: when the patient waives privilege, 
when the patient is being given a court ordered examination and is 
informed in advance of the lack of privileged communication, and when 
the psychiatrist is being sued for malpractice. Seventy-three percent 
of psychiatrists favored privileged communication when patients were 
involved in civil actions, whereas 63% favored such a statute when 
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clients were involved in criminal actions. Finally, 28% of the psy-
chiatrists reported at least one case within the last five years in 
which they felt that privileged communication had been a "s_ignificant 
factor." The role of privileged communication in these cases is not 
known. The authors noted that based on some of the psychiatrists' 
comments, it seemed that many of them had confused the term "confiden-
tiality" with "privileged communication." 
Studies of the second type which examined psychologists' atti-
tudes and behaviors in the clinical management of confidentiality, 
have generally revealed that psychologists willft,lly violate laws 
which they feel are not in their clients' best interest. This posi-
~ion changes to some degree, however, when the psychologists' legal 
liabilities are called into question. 
In one such survey, Swoboda et al. (1978) provided a vignette of 
a family therapy case in which child abuse was disclosed. Although 
two thirds of all of the respondents were aware of the mandatory child 
abuse reporting law, 87% of the psychologists, 63% of the psychia-
trists, and 50% of the social workers said that they would not report 
the child abuse, choosing instead to proceed with clinical management 
of the case. Lack of familiarity with the law did not seem to be a 
primary reason why a professional would break the law. The authors 
speculate that the reason mental health professionals would choose to 
break the law is because the laws appear to be punitively oriented 
while the helping professional is therapeutically oriented. 
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Jagim, Wittman, & Noll (1978) surveyed psychotherapists in North 
Dakota and found that virtually all of the therapists felt that confi-
dentiaity was essential to maintaining a positive therapeu~ic rela-
tionship and believed that clients expected that their communications 
would remain confidential. When forced with a hypothetical choice 
between disclosing confidential information or accepting a contempt of 
court citation, 59% of those surveyed indicated that they would prefer 
the latter. However, when choosing between maintaining confidential-
ity or breaking it when a third party was in danger, 71% of the sub-
jects chose disclosure to that third party. The authors postulated 
several possible reasons for the results: 
The respondents' endorsement of disclosure of information may 
reflect their concern for third party or societal interests (e.g., 
insure third party safety). On the other hand, their endorsement 
may reflect merely their feeling that they ought to comply with 
laws requiring disclosure (Jagim et al., 1978, p.463). 
Unfortunately, insufficient data were collected to know exactly why 
the psychologists responded in the way that they did. Was it out of 
ethical or l~gal considerations, or both? Did Tarasoff sensitize them 
to be more legally conservative? It would be interesting to see if 
confidentiality were managed differently when faced with the clinical 
situation of a patient threatening harm towards others as opposed to 
threatening harm towards himself. 
Kahle and Sales (1978) surveyed members of division 12 (clinical 
psychology) of the APA concerning their attitudes toward involuntary 
commitment. Clinical psychologists were asked to respond to question-
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naire items by rating them on a 7 point Likert scale. While no sta-
tistical analyses were performed on the data, it is striking to com-
pare the means of some of the items. Psychologists rated the cri-
terion: "dangerous to others and mentally ill" (H=6.18) as a more 
suitable criterion for involuntary commitment than "dangerous to self 
and mentally ill" (H=5.57). Obviously at least some of the respon-
dents made the value judgment that a patient threatening to hurt him-
self is less of a reason to take evasive action than when the patient 
is threatening to hurt someone else. One cannot help but think that 
Tarasoff had some rol~ in producing this discrepancy in values. 
Although the Tarasoff decision seems to have had some impact on 
the mental health professions, the actual effects are difficult to 
measure. Wise's (1978) survey asked for psychiatrists' subjective 
impressions of the impact of the Tarasoff decision on their work. It 
is hard to know if the Tarasoff ruling actually caused a change in 
therapeutic behavior since no pre-Tarasoff measures were given., Other 
studies supp~rt the idea that professionals are sensitized to the 
issue. Therapists seem to be more willing to take action (such as 
hospitalization) when a patient is dangerous to others as compared to 
dangerous to self (Kahle & Sales, 1978). Furthermore, Jagim et al. 
(1978) found that while 59% of therapists felt strongly enough about 
the importance of confidentiality to the point that they would rather 
face contempt than break confidentiality, 71% would break confiden-
tiality in order to warn a third party whom a patient had threatened 
harm. 
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The surveys of the third type, those which have examined the 
practices of mental health professionals in their reporting of client 
information to various institutions, have revealed a state of confu-
sion and misunderstanding as to what is acceptable practice. Noll and 
Hanlon (1976) surveyed all 50 state mental health department directors 
as well as 210 community mental health center directors across all 50 
states regarding policies and actual practice in reporting confiden-
tial patient information (name, address, and social security number). 
One or more of these pieces of personal information were given to 
state mental health departments by 30% of the local community mental 
health centers. Of these, 36~ did so without infnrming th~ir pati9~ts 
of such a practice. The confusion regarding what and how confidential 
information should be disclosed to state officials was displayed when 
in some cases, mental heath center directors reported that they w~re 
granted no discretion in what had to be reported when t:heir own state 
mental health departments indicated that this was not the case. Only 
one of the 50 states (Connecticut) had enacted legislation which pro-
hibited revealing this kind of private information. Noll and Hanlon 
emphasized the fact that the individual's right to privacy is being 
violated'by mental health officials on a large scale through such 
reporting practices. It would have been interesting to know if the 
therapists who were working with these patients were aware that this 
personal information was being reported, and if so, how they felt that 
such practices affected their clinical work. 
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Although the limited research to date suggests that much confu-
sion and uncertainty exists regarding confidentiality and the Tarasoff 
decision, conclusions beyond this are difficult to draw. N0ne of the 
studies surveyed a large number of psychologists, and usually surveyed 
practitioners within a small geographic region. The studies have gen-
erally been limited to a survey of mental health professionals' knowl-
edge or opinion regarding existing child abuse, privilege, or civil 
commitment statutes. Nowhere were psychologists' daily management of 
confidentiality explored. There also has been no empirical research 
which has examined what factors influence psychologists' management of 
-:onfid mtiality. 
Summary and Research Questions 
The literature does suggests that there is considerable varia-
tion among psych:>logists as to their attitudes and actual behaviors in 
clinical situations where confidentiality or privileged communication 
becomes an issue. The literature also suggests that the following 
variables may affect the management of confidentiality: theoretical 
orientation, presence or absence of privileged communication, effects 
from the Tarasoff decision, and prior experience with breaches of con-
fidentiality. An additional variable, the level of the client's func-
tioning, although not explored in the literature, seems to be an 
important variable which may affect how confidentiality gets managed. 
All of these variables were studied singly and in combination in this 
research. 
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The present study surveyed practicing psychologists in seven 
states regarding their knowledge and management of confidentiality. 
The questionnaire used in the survey, which is described i~·detail in 
the Method section, employed a number of question formats from open-
ended questions to Likert scale items. These items were explored both 
qualitatively and quantitatively to provide descriptive data about 
what psychologists know about confidentiality, and how they routinely 
manage confidentiality during the course of their day-to-day clinical 
work. In addition, specific therapist variables such as orientation, 
privilege status, and previous brf·aches of confidentiality were exam-
ined ~or their influerc~ on the psychologists' knowledge of laws and 
statLtes, as well as P.ow it influences their routine management of 
confidentiality. These variables were further analyzed for their 
effects on hew a psycl,ol0gist handles confidentiality in specific 
situations such as wh~n a client is harmful to self or others. 
Finally, the psychologists' opinions about different statutes, ethical 
guidelines, and the Tarasoff decision were examined. 
The specific questions investigated fall into five general 
areas. In many cases, questions in those areas were aimed at gather-
ing descriptive data and hypothses were not advanced. In some cases 
where hypotheses were being tested, the specific predictions are given 
following the investigative question. 
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Knowledge of Confidentiality. This category was included for a 
number of reasons. Previous research has suggested that psychiatrists 
may be confused about the terms "confidentiality" and "priv~ileged com-
munication" Suarez and Balcanoff (1966), and that many mental health 
professionals may be unaware of their privilege status (Jagim et al, 
1978; Suarez and Balcanoff, 1966). However, knowledge in this area 
has not been systematically examined on a large scale. Additionally, 
whether or not a psychologist knows what these concepts means is 
important in terms of understanding the implications of other ques-
tions which use these concepts. Thus, the first question in this cat-
egory was: 
1. Do psychologists know what the terms the terms "confidentiality" 
and "privileged c.ommunication" mean? 
2. Do psy~hologists know ~hether or not they have privileged communi-
cation in their state of practice? 
3.How familiar are psychologists with the confidentiality and privi-
lege laws in their state of practice? 
Routine Management of Confidentiality. This area was important 
to include, because nowhere in the literature is there a good, compre-
hensive description of how psychologists manage confidentiality in 
their day-to-day work. The specific questions in this area were: 
4. Under what type of conditions (i.e., with a patient's knowledge 
only, with a patient's consent and knowledge, or with neither) 
would a psychologist divulge confidential information tn: the 
patient's family? the patient's employer? an insurance carrier? 
with a colleague? with a collection agency? Are there significant 
differences in how willing psychologists might be to share such 
information with these different people? 
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5. What percentage of psychologists say something about confidential-
ity from the outset of therapy? 
6. What do most psy~hologists tell their patients about confidential-
ity from the outset of therapy? 
7. How many of the psychologists have felt that their position on con-
fidentiality has changed? In what way and why has it changed? 
Factors Influenci~ Knowledge and Routine Management of Confi-
dentiality. The influence of the specific factors such as: theoreti-
cal orientation, privilege status, and previous breaches of confiden-
tiality on the management of confidentiality is a new feature in the 
research in this area. The first two questions in this category dealt 
with analyzing what factors may affect a psychologist's knowledge of 
various definitions and statutes. 
8. Does the accuracy of psychologists' definitions of "confidential-
ity" and "privileged communication" vary according to previous 
breaches of confidentiality or privilege status? 
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9. Is a psychologist's knowledge about whether or not he/she has priv-
ilege commmunication affected by privilege status? It was pre~ 
dieted that the psychologists in states which do not have privi-
leged communication should have more accurate definitions of 
privileged communication than psychologists in states which have 
privileged communication. It was also predicted that those psy-
chologists with a history of previous breaches of confidentiality 
should have more accurate definitions of both confidentiality and 
privileged communication. Based on this reasoning then, it was 
further predicted that psychologists who have had to break confi-
dentiality before and who also do not have privileged communication 
would have the most accurate definitions. 
In addition to the role of these variables as they affect psy-
chologists' knowledge about confidentiality, is the influence of these 
variables on psychologists' routine management of confidentiality. 
10. Does the presence or absence of privileged communucation affect 
how a psychologist routinely manages confidentiality and its limits 
in therapy? It was predicted that psychologists in states without 
privileged communication will be more likely to inform their 
clients about confidentiality from the outset of therapy; it was 
also predicted that they would be more explicit about what the lim-
its are since they (theoretically) have an additional limit placed 
on them. 
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11. Will a previous breach of confidentiality sensitize psychologists 
in any way to be more familiar with the laws governing confiden-
tiality in their state of practice? It was predicted that psychol-
ogists who have had to breach confidentiality in the past will be 
more familiar with their state confidentiality laws. 
12. Will those psychologists who have had to break confidentiality in 
the past be more likely to report having changed their position on 
confidentiality at some point in their careers? It was predicted 
that psychologists who have had to break confidentiality in the 
past will be more likely to report a change in their position. 
13. Do those psychologists who have had to break confidentiality in 
the past differ from those who have not in terms of what and when 
they tell their clients about the limits of confidentialty? It was 
predicted that psychologists who have had to break confidentielity 
in the past, particularly where it has affected the therapy, will 
be more lfkely to inform their clients of the limits of confiden-
tiality, and to do so more often from the outset of therapy. 
14. Does a psychologist's theoretical orientation affect what and when 
he(she) tells a client about confidentiality? The clinical litera-
ture suggests that psychodynamic writers may be more likely to take 
an "absolute confidentiality" position than other clinicians. How-
ever, theoretical orientation is another variable that has never 
been tested empirically for its effect on the management of confi-
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dentiality. It was predicted that psychodynamically oriented psy-
chologists would: (a) be less likely to mention anything about con-
fidentiality from the outset of therapy; and (b) mention· fewer lim-
its to confidentiality if the issue is raised at the outset of 
therapy. 
Management of Confidentiality in Specific Clinical Situations. 
The first questions in this area were asked to see if psychologists 
manage confidentiality differently based on whether a patient was 
threatening harm towards himself or towards someone else. Three ques-
tions were asked using the same independent variables: theoretical 
orientation, and whether a client was threatening harm towards solf or 
others. The dependent variable was modified slightly in each ques-
tion, but always examined what might be said to the patient in the 
first session after the patient has hinted that he might do so~ething 
harmful. These questions were asked separately because of a problem 
in establishing an interval scale which would have allowed them to be 
combined into one variable. 
15. Does the degree to which a psychologist informs a client about the 
limits of confidentiality change as a function of theoretical ori-
entation or whether a client is threatening harm towards himself or 
threatening harm towards others? 
16. Does the frequency with which a psychologist tells a client from 
the outset of therapy that everything is confidentiality change as 
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a function of theoretical orientation or whether or not the client 
was threatening harm towards himself or threatening harm towards 
others? 
17. Does a psychologist's tendency to say nothing at all about confi-
dentiality from the start of therapy change as a function of theo-
retical orientation or whether a client is threatening harm towards 
himself or towards others? Theoretical orientation was included in 
these analyses because previous psychodynamic writers have sug-
gested that they would maintain absolute confidentiality even under 
Tarasoff conditions. An attempt was made to see if such a manage-
ment of ~onfidentiality might be used by psyc:1odynarnic clinicians 
in the survey. It was predicted that psychologists will: (a) 
inform about the limits of confidentiality to a greater extent, (b) 
be less likely to assure the client that evervthing is confiden-
tial, and (c) be less likely to say nothing at all about confiden-
tiality when a client is threatening harm towards others as corn-
pared towards self. It was predicted that the psychodynamic 
psychologists would maintain more of an absolute confidentiality 
stance than the other psychologists. 
In order to understand qualitatively how psychologists think 
through confidentiality when a client is threatening harm, the follow-
ing question was asked: 
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18. Are there some psychologists who would maintain absolute confiden-
tiality under Tarasoff conditions? If so, what is there rationale? 
A second specific clinical situation was created in the ques-
tionnaire. This situation dealt specifically with privileged communi-
cation and was intended to evaluate if a client's level of functioning 
affected a therapist's willingness to testify about that client in a 
child custody suit. The literature suggests that clinicians differ on 
their view about the maintenance of absolute confidentiality. Some 
clinicians embrace the duty to warn established by Tarasoff as a wel-
comed therapeutic lever that they can employ. It would be of interest 
to know if the situation of being asked to testify in court about a 
client could constitute a similar kind of therapeutic lever. That is, 
whether oy not there may be some therapeutic advantage to offer such 
testimony. Thus, the following questions were asked: 
19. Would psychologists tell their clients that the law protects them 
from a su~poena when that client raises the possibility that the 
therapist might be subpoenaed to testify about thie client's fit-
ness as a parent in a child custody suit? Would this decision be 
based on the client's level of functioning, or the therapist's 
privilege status or theoretical orientation? It was predicted that 
psychologists would be more in favor of testifying if the client is 
functioning reasonably well than if the client has long-standing 
emotional problems where her fitness as a parent could legitimately 
be called into question. Furthermore, it was predicted that non-
psychodynamically oriented psychologists whose clients are func-
tioning well will be the most likely to testify in this ~ype of 
situation. Related to this is the question: 
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20. Would psychologists with the low functioning patient be more 
likely to consult with a lawyer? It was predicted that they will. 
Psychologists' opinions about different statutes, court deci-
sions, and ethical guidelines. This area was introduced into the 
research because the literature had suggested that it was not clear 
how psychologist~ felt about various ethical guidelines and court 
decisions. For ~xample, although reviewers of Tarasoff were very 
critical about the decision, Wise (1978) discovered in his research 
that some psychiqtrists welcomed a ruling which would tell them what 
to do when a client was imminently dangerous. The first of the ques-
tions in this area was: 
21. What impact do psychologists feel their state laws on the presence 
or absence or privilege communication have on their clinical work? 
Is their opinion affected by privilege status? It was predicted 
that the psychologists with privilege will view their state laws as 
impacting more favorably on their clinical work than those without 
privilege. 
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22. What do psychologists think about an ethical guideline which 
requires that clients be informed in advance of the limits of con-
fidentiality? Is their opinion affected by their theoratical ori-
entation? It was predicted that the psychodynamic psychologists 
will be less in favor of such a guideline compared to other psy-
chologists. 
23. How familiar are psychologists with the Tarasoff decision? 
24. If familiar with the Tarasoff case, what kind of impact does it 
have on their clinical work? The next chapter will explain how the 
data were collected to answer all of these questions. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Participants 
Psychologists were chosen from the National Register of Health 
Service Providers in Psychology (1983). 1 All 233 psychologists from 
the Register were surveyed in the four states which did not have priv-
ileged communication at the time of the initial mailing (Iowa, South 
Carolina, West Virginia, and Vermont). 2 The same number of psycholo-
gists were chosen at random from three neighboring states which have 
very liberal privileged communication laws (Illinois, Georgia, and 
Pennsylvania). There was a total of 1,956 psychologists listed in tte 
National Register in the four states with privilege from which the 233 
psychologists from these states were drawn. This second sample was 
stratified e::cording to state in order to insure that the sample was 
representative of the different populations in those states. Subjects 
within each state (stratum) were chosen on a random basis. Obviously 
the sample of psychologists in the no-privilege states was not strati-
~ 
using the 1981 edition with the 1982-83 supplement. 
l Excerpts from the statutes on confidentiality and privileged com-
munication for each of the seven states are presented in Appendix A. 
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fied since each member of that population was sent the questionnaire. 
A total, therefore, of 466 psychologists was mailed questionnair~s. 
Using an estimate of a 40% return rate, a minimum of 186 com-
pleted questionnaires was predicted. The number of surveys mailed, 
the number returned, and the return rates for each state are presented 
in Table 1. The mean return rate across all of the states was 41.9%. 
The lowest return rate was from Vermont (28.3%) while the highest 
return rate was from West Virginia (69.0%). Table 2 contains demo-
graphic data of the sample while Table 3 shows the nature of the clin-
ical &ctivities of the sample. Included in both of these tables are 
some correspcnding data from members of the National Register of 
Health Service Providers in Psychology as of 1978 (Vandenbos, Stapp, & 
Kilburg, 1981). 
The sample of psychologists in the present study was comprised 
of predominantly male (76.6%) psychologists. They tended to be APA 
members (91.9%) holding a Ph.D. (79.3%) whose major field of graduate 
study was in clinical psychology (71.8%). They had an average of 16.1 
years of experience. Their primary treatment modality was individual 
psychotherapy, averaging 14.8 hours of individual therapy per week. 
Seventy-one percent of their patient load was adult while 15% were 
adolescent and 14% child. Many psychologists in the sample (56.5%) 
indicated that they were eclectic; however, such an "orientation" was 
broken down into more discrete orientations for the sake of later 
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TABLE 1 
Survey Response Rate by State 
State Number Number Number Return 
Surveys Surveys Returned Rate 
Mailed(a) Mailed(b) 
IL 106 103 44 42.7 
PA 96 92 37 40.2 
GA 31 29 10 34.5 
IA 76 73 ::.1 42.5 
WV 33 29 20 69.0 
SC 77 77 33 42.9 
VT 47 46 13 28.3 
Totals 466 449 188 41.9 
(a) reflects number initially mailed 
(b) reflects number which reached targeted psychologists 
Variable 
Sex 
Nale 
Female 
APA member 
Yes 
No 
Degree 
PhD 
PsyD 
EdD 
NA / NS 
TABLE 2 
Sample Demographics 
N 
144 
44 
171 
15 
149 
1 
10 
28 
% 
76.6 
23.4 
91.0 
8.0 
79.3 
0.5 
5.3 
14.9 
Najar Field Grad Study 
Clinical 135 71.8 
Counseling 32 17.0 
Educational Psy. 5 2.7 
School 5 2.7 
Other 10 5.3 
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Population % 
71.1 
28.9 
83.R 
64.0 
14.2 
2.0 
8.5 
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TABLE 3 
Professional Practice of Respondents 
Variable Mean (S.D.) Population 
Years Experience 16.10 (8.44) 11.73 
Weekly Clinical Work (hours) 
Individual therapy 14.80 (10.10) 
Group/Family therapy 3.73 (4. 72) 
Testing 5.40 (7.99) 
Other -~. 00 (2.74) 
Mean % age of clients 
Adult 70.68 (31. 25) 
Adolescent 15.34 (18.70) 
Child 13.98 (18 .10) 
Theoretical Orientation N % 
Psychodynamic 62 33.0 
Cognitive-behavioral 74 39.4 
Behavioral 11 5.9 
Humanistic 40 21.3 
Missing 1 0.5 
53 
analyses. If respondents were eclectic, they were encouraged to rank 
order the influence of other orientations on their eclecticism. The 
orientation which a psychologist ranked first was used as his(her) 
official orientation. The discrete orientations in the questionnaire 
were collapsed into four categories for the purpose of data analysis. 
Rational emotive therapy and family systems therapy were combined with 
cognitive behavioral; person-centered, gestalt, and existential were 
all combined under "humanistic." Psychodynamic and behavioral framed 
their own categories. Based on such a categorization, their predomi-
nant theoretical orientations were cognitive behavioral (39.4%), psy-
chodynamic (33.0%) and humanistic (21.3%). 
Materials 
The questionnaire which was designed for this study was created 
to gather descriptive data about psychologi~ts' management of privi-
leged communication and confidentiality as well as to test the effects 
of specific yariables which may affect the management of confidential-
ity. The survey used a wide range of question formats from open-
ended, short answer items to specific Likert scale items. Among the 
/ 
55 items in the survey (se~ Appendix B), 12 were open-ended requiring 
that the respondent write a few sentences in order to answer the item. 
There were also 31 closed-ended (i.e., Likert scale) items, and the 
remaining 12 items were "semi-open-ended" requiring a fill-in-the-
blank type of answer. All three types of questions were used to test 
the effects of the specific variables in question. 
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The demographic descriptive items which were used in the ques-
tionnaire were derived from a number of sources. Those items dea~ing 
with APA division status, degree, and theoretical orientation were 
modelled after the research conducted by Vandenbos, Stapp, and Kilburg 
(1981). The theoretical orientation categories were based on research 
by Garfield and Kurz (1976,1977), Wildman and Wildman (1967), and Ivey 
(1980). The item which asked about the type of setting that the 
respondents work in was modelled after a survey by Stapp and Fulcher 
(1982). 
Part of this study was exploratory and descriptive in nature. 
The descriptive i1.ems, which used all three types of qctestion formats, 
sought to find out what psychologists typically tell their clients 
about confidentiality, when they tell them, and why. They also sought 
to describe the situations under which the psychologists would be 
willing to share private and confidential information about a patient 
to various third parties (e.g., with the patient's employer, family 
member, insurance company, or with a professional colleague). The 
descriptive items asked psychologists to discuss any changes in recent 
years in their views on confidentiality and to speculate about why 
they feel these changes have come about. Finally, the respondents 
were asked to discuss any experiences with breaches of confidentiality 
and whether they feel that these breaches affected the therapy. 
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As in the study by Swoboda et al. (1978), vignettes were used in 
this research in order to have a standard clinical situation in which 
to evaluate the psychologists' attitudes and behaviors con~erning con-
fidentiality. Two types of clinical vignettes were used in the pres-
ent study. One dealt with confidentiality under a Tarasoff condition, 
the other more specifically with privileged communication. Each type 
of vignette contained two forms. In the confidentiality vignette, one 
form contained a situation where the client was potentially harmful 
towards himself while in the other form the potential harm was toward 
others. 
The confidentiality vignette: 
An agency has r~ferred a 25 year old man to you for individual 
psychotherapy. You were told in the referral that this man has 
had trouble in the past with impulses to harm others (himself). 
You agree to work this man. In his first session with you, he 
tries to tell you what is troubling him but stops himself and 
expresses a fear that if he is more explicit about what these 
impulses are, then you as the therapist might take some action 
against }1im such as hospitalizing him or calling the police. 
Two different privileged communication vignettes were created, 
one in which the client is functioning well, the other where the 
client is not doing very well. Each subject was randomly given one of 
the following vignettes: 
High functioning vignette: 
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For three months now you have been treating a 35 year old woman 
who entered therapy following a recent divorce. It is your 
impression that she has functioned quite well psychologically 
throughout much of her life and is presently trying to adjust to 
her new roles as single woman and single parent since ~he divorce. 
She has attended her sessions regularly and seems to be making 
progress. Her ex-husband has just expressed his intention to take 
her to court in order to obtain custody of the children on the 
grounds that your client is an unfit parent. Your client fears 
that her ex-husband may use the fact that she is in therapy as 
evidence against her. She is concerned about continuing in ther-
apy out of fear that it will leave the impression in court that 
she is emotionally unstable. During the course of the session she 
also mentions that her husband intends to file for a subpoena in 
order to have you testify about your client's emotional stability. 
Low functioning vignette: 
For three l~'onths now you have been treating a 35 year old woman 
who entered therapy following a recent divorce. It is your 
impression that she has not functioned very well psychologically 
throughout most of her life. She has a history of depression for 
which she haE', been hospitalized three times, the most recent of 
which followed a nearly fatal suicide attempt. Her present 
attempt to adjust to her new roles as single woman and single 
parent since the dlvorce is but one of many "crises" which this 
woman has experienced. She has attended her sessions regularly 
and seems to be making a little progress. Her ex-husband has just 
expressed his intention to take her to court in order to obtain 
custody of the children on the grounds that your client is an 
unfit parent. Your client fears that her ex-husband may use the 
fact that she is in therapy as evidence against her. Your client 
is concerned about continuing in therapy out of fear that it will 
leave the impression in court that she is emotionally unstable. 
During the course of the session she also mentions that her hus-
band intends to file for a subpoena in order to have you testify 
about your client's emotional stability. 
Both the privileged communication and the confidentiality vig-
nettes were based on actual clinical situations. They were also evalu-
ated by ten clinical psychologists for authenticity and believeability 
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before they were included in the questionnaire. The ten psychologists 
also provided feedback concerning the clarity of the items and the 
length of the questionnaire. 
Procedure 
A variation of the "Total Design Method" (TDM) was used in the 
preparation and dissemination of the questionnaires (Dillman, 1978). 
The questionnaire which was used in the present research was not only 
lengthy, but also contained a large proportion of items which were 
open-ended. The use of some type of follow-up mailing, therefore, was 
necessary. Because this survey asked psychologists abuut their com-
pliance with laws and ethical guidelines, it was desirable not to com-
promise the anonymity of the questionnaires by coding them. 
The questionnaires together with a cover letter were mailed fol-
lowing the recommended guidelines of the TDM. The only variation in 
the TDM was that the questionnaires were sent anonymously, hence they 
were not coded. Thank you/reminder post cards (see Appendix C) were 
mailed five days after the initial mailing of the questionnaires as 
consistent with the TDM strategy. Seven days after this mailing, a 
second wave of thank you/reminder post cards was mailed. This second 
mailing of post cards was in lieu of Dillman's recommendation to mail 
second questionnaires and reminder letters to those who have not yet 
sent their questionnaires in. Because the questionnaires were not 
coded, it was not possible to determine who should receive a second 
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mailing of the questionnaire. If the Total Design Method were to be 
carried out completely (including a third mailing of the question-
naires to non-resonders by registered mail), then a return ~ate in 
excess of 70% could have been expected (Dillman, 1978). Because some 
of the steps of the TDM were not used in the present research, how-
ever, a return rate of between 40 and 50 percent was predicted. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Knowledge of Confidentiality 
Several questions regarding psychologists' general knowledge 
about confidentiality were explored. The first concerned basic knowl-
edge of terms. In the survey, psychologists were asked to define the 
terms "confident5ality" and "privileged communication" (item 26 of the 
questjonnaire). Their written definitions of the term "confidential-
ity" received one of three scores; 6.5% of the psychologists received 
a score of zero indicating that either they could not provide a def i-
nitit'n (this is different from not answering the item) or they pro-
vided a definition which was· grossly inaccurate; 43.5% of the psychol-
ogists defined confidentiality as an agreement to not disclose private 
information without the client's permission (and received a score of 
1), and 50% of the psychologists also added that the term contained 
exceptions or that it was a legally binding obligation to not disclose 
(score of 2). On the average the psychologists were familiar with the 
term(~= 1.44, S.D. = 0.62). 
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The psychologists' privileged communication definitions also 
received one of three scores; 70.6% of the respondents received a 
score of zero which meant at least one of the following: (a) they 
stated that they did not know what the term meant, (b) they equated 
the term entirely with the term "confidentiality," or they (c) stated 
that confidentiality is an ethical term and that privileged communica-
tion is simply a legal definition of confidentiality. A score of "1" 
was received by 2.9% of the psychologists by acknowledging that the 
two terms (confidentiality and privileged communication) were clearly 
different from one another but did not, like the remaining 26.5% of 
the respondents, indicate that privileged communication means th&t a 
psychologist is protected from having to testify about a client in a 
court of law (score of 2). Thus, only slightly more than one-fourth 
of the sample provided accurate definitions of the term "privileged 
communication." 
Apart from whether or not the psychologists knew what the term 
"privileged ~ommunication" meant, an attempt was made to see if they 
knew whether or not they had privileged communication in their state 
of practice (Question 2). In order to test this, an error score was 
created for each psychologist based on his (her) response to item 34 
of the questionnaire. If a psychologist had privilege in his state of 
practice, then his "correct answer" for item 34 was "5-definitely has 
privilege." If that psychologist were to indicate that he, 
"4-probably had privilege," then he was assigned an error score of 
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"1." The mean error score across all psychologists was 0. 89 
(S.D.=1.24), indicating that as a group, the psychologists were gener-
ally aware of whether or not they had privilege in their state of 
practice. However, there was a significant difference across states in 
their error scores, E (6,179)=3.39, £,<.005. A Neuman Keuls post hoc 
pairwise comparison of mean error scores indicated that psychologists 
from Iowa (~= 1.43) and West Virginia (~=1.40) had significantly 
higher error scores (at the .01 level) than psychologists from Georgia 
(~=0.10). Vermont psychologists (~=1.31) had significantly higher 
error scores than those fro~ Georgia (at the .05 level). Although 
psychologists from Illinois (~=0.80), Pennsylvania (~=0.62) and South 
Carolina (~=0.56) had low error scores, they were not significantly 
different than psychologists from any other states. 
The last question in this category was concerned with how famil-
iar psychologists are with the confidentiality laws in their state of 
practice. Because states varied in accessibility of their confiden-
tiality laws, only psychologists from Illinois were used in the analy-
sis. These psychologists were asked to rate how legal it would be for 
them to share confidential information about their clients with sev-
eral different people. Legality was rated on a 5 point Likert scale 
with a score of 1 indicating "definitely illegal," a score of 3 indi-
cating "not sure," and a score of 5 indicating "definitely legal." 
For each situation which tested a psychologist's knowledge of a given 
statute or exception, a "correct" answer for each state was deter-
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mined. If a particular clinical behavior as defined by the state law 
is judged to be legal, then the "correct answer" was (5) - definitely 
legal. A psychologist from this state who answered (4) "pr_obably 
legal," in response to this item, received an "error score" of 1 for 
that item. The error score thus increased the further in magnitude 
and direction the psychologist's score departed from the "correct 
answer." 
A potential problem with this scoring system is in the assump-
tion that the correct answer is either a 1 or a 5. It was for this 
re~son that only psychologists from Illinois, which has clear-cut, 
minimally imbiguous and "readily accessible" statues, were included 
in this analysis. The mean legal ratings and error scores are pre-
sented in Table 4. The error score was not calculated for psycholo-
gists' knowledge of how legal it would be to contact a collection 
agency since this situation is not discussed in the Illino~s confiden· 
tiality statutes. 
The Illinois psychologists believed that it was legal to break 
confidentiality when a client was imminently dangerous or when the 
psychologist wished to consult with a colleague about certain trou-
bling aspects of the case. They were on the average "not sure" if it 
was legal to break confidentiality when contacting a collection agency 
to recover money from an unpaid bill. Although still "not sure," they 
tended to rate it "illegal" to provide more detailed information about 
TABLE 4 
Legal Ratings and Error Scores 
of Illinois Psychologists on how 
Legal it Would be to Break 
Confidentiality in Different Situations 
Legal Error 
Situation: rating(a) score(b) 
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
Client imminently dangerous 4.69 (0.52) 0.31 (0.52) 
Family member wants information 1. 78 (0.91) 0.78 (0.91) 
Client's employer wants info. 1.45 (0.71) 0.45 (0.71) 
You want to consult colleague 3.81 ( 1. 07) 1.19 ( 1. 07) 
Insurer wants more information 2.73 (1. 39) 1. 76 ( 1. 39) 
You want to contact call. agency 3.22 (1.17) (c) 
(a) the higher the rating, the more they felt that it 
was legal to break confidentiality 
(b) the higher the error score, the less accurate 
were the legal ratings. 
(c) not computed since this situation is not discussed 
in Illinois statutes. 
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a client to an insurance carrier without the client's knowledge and 
consent. The psychologists rated it "illegal" to give out information 
to a client's family or employer without the client's cons~nt. The 
psychologists as a group seemed to be quite aware of their state con-
fidentiality statutes, having a total mean error score of 0.90. 
In order to check for differences in error scores across the 
five situations, an apriori repeated measures analysis of variance was 
conducted. The analysis yielded a main effect for "situation" 
EC4,232)=9.98, £<.001. A post hoc Newman-Keuls pair-wise comparison 
of mean error scores was conducted to see where these differences 
occurred. Eight of the ten pair·wise comparisons were significant 
(seven at the .01 level). The psychologists were the most accurate in 
their assessment of whether or not it was legal to break confidential-
ity when a patient was imminently dange~·ous (~=0. 31) or to consult 
with the client's emp]_oyer (~=O.ILS) than in any of the other situ-
ations. They were the least accurate in rating the legality of 
breaching coafidentiality in order to answer questions from the 
client's insurance company (~=1.76) or to consult with a colleague 
(~=1.19). The other situations, answering questions from a family 
member or contacting a collection agency, had error scores which fell 
inbetween the two extremes. The error scores were significantly dif-
ferent from each other and from the other conditions. 
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In summary, psychologists as a group knew what the term "confi-
dentiality'' meant, but only one-fourth provided accurate definitions 
of "privileged communication." Even though they were not ahle to pro-
vide accurate definitions of the latter term, they generally were 
aware of whether or not they had privileged communication. The psy-
chologists from three of the states, however, (Iowa, Vermont, and West 
Virginia) were significantly less aware of their privilege status than 
the psychologists in Georgia, with psychologists from Illinois, Penn-
sylvania, and South Carolina falling somewhere in between. On the 
average, psychologists from Illinois were aware of their state confi-
dentiality statutes. They had the lowest error score in rating the 
legality of breaching confidentiality when a patient was imminently 
dangerous, and the highest e'rror score regarding the legality of 
breaching confidentialty when answering questions from a client's 
insurance company. 
Routine Management of Confidentiality 
The first investigative question in this area (Question 4) con-
cerned psychologists' willingness to share confidential information in 
various situations. Psychologists were presented with six clinical 
situations and asked to indicate the conditions under which they would 
share information in each situation. The four conditions, their cor-
responding scores, and the third party situations are presented in 
Table 5. The mean score for the condition under which identifying, 
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confidential information would be shared with a third party when a 
client was believed to be imminently dangerous to self or others (item 
27) was 3.31 (S.D.=0.53). Only one respondent would never breach con-
fidentiality under this situation, while 63.8% would share this infor-
mation only with the client's knowledge but not necessarily with his 
consent, and 34.1% would share this information without requiring the 
client's consent or knowledge. 
When a family member of a client contacts a psychologist and 
wants to know why that client is having so many difficulties (item 
28), most of the psychologists waul~ require the client's consent 
before revealing such information (~=1.86, S.D.=0.36); 14.6% indicated 
that they would never share this information with the family member 
under any circumstance, 84.9% would require the client's consent, and 
only one psychologist would give this information without the client's 
knowledge. No one would share this information without the client's 
knmvledge. 
Were a client's employer to contact a psychologist for an expla-
nation of why that client has missed so much work (item 29), all but 
one of the psychologists (99.5%) would atleast require the client's 
consent and knowledge (~=1.76, S.D.=0.46), and of these, 24.9% would 
not share such information with the employer under any circumstance. 
Under the situation where the psychologist wanted to share per-
sonal, identifying information about a client with a colleague because 
TABLE 5 
Conditions Under Which Psychologists 
Share Confidential Information 
Score: Condition: 
1. Would not share such information under 
any circumstance. 
2. Would share such information only with 
a cl:i_ent' s complete consent and knowledge. 
3. Would share such inf:>rmati;m 
with a client's knowledge, but not 
necessarily with a client's consent. 
4. Neither a client's consent nor knowledge 
is necessary. 
Situation: Mean S.D. 
Score 
Dangerous pt 3.31 0.53 
Family 1.86 0.36 
Employer 1. 76 0.46 
Colleague 3.28 0.94 
Insurer 2.02 0.35 
Collection agency 2.39 1.18 
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of certain troubling aspects of the case, (item 30), a bimodal fre-
quency was observed (~=3.28, S.D.=0.94); 59.5% would require neither a 
client's consent nor knowledge in order to share this information, 
11.9% would require the client's knowledge alone, 25.9% would require 
both the client's consent and knowledge, and only 2.7% would not share 
this information under any circumstance. 
If an insurance carrier were to contact a psychologist and ask 
for a more detailed description of the client's treatment in order to 
warrant further treatment (item 31), most psychologists (90.9%) would 
require the client's knowledge and consent before sharing the informa-
tion (~=2.02, S.D.=0.-35); 4.3% would not share the informa~:ion under 
any circumstance while 1.19% would share the information without the 
client's knowledge. 
The situatior1 in which tJ:-e psychologist ~vanted to contact a col-
lection agency in an attempt to recover money from an unpaid bill 
(item 32) co;1tained the largest variation in responses of any of the 
third party situations presented to the respondents (~=2.39, 
S.D.=1.18). Twenty percent of the psychologists would not require the 
ex-client's knowledge; 35.6% would require only the client's knowl-
edge, 6.9% would also require the client's consent while 37.4% would 
not share this information with a collection agency at all. 
In order to examine differences in willingness to share informa-
tion across the six clinical situations, the psychologists' ratings 
were subjected to an (a priori) repeated measures analysis of vari-
ance. The analysis yielded a significant effect for condition, 
f(5,195)=36.27, £<.001. A post hoc Newman-Keuls pairwise comparison 
of the six means revealed numerous significant differences among the 
six conditions. Because of the large number of comparisons, they are 
presented in summary form in Table 6. 
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Almost all of the six conditions were significantly different from one 
another at the .01 level, with the following two exceptions. The con-
ditions under which psychologists would share confidential, identify-
ing information about a patient when that patient was dangerous, was 
nc t significantly diff~rent from the Ct'rditions under which informa-
tion would be shared ~-:ith a colleague. t-1oreover, the conditions under 
which information would te shared with a family member was not signif-
icantly different than when giving infvrmation to the patient's 
employer. Tn their routine management of confidentiality, the psy-
chologists were significantly more willing to share information with-
out a patien~'s consent when the patient was imminently dangerous, or 
when the psychologist wished to consult with a colleague than in any 
of the other four situations. They were significantly more willing to 
break confidentiality in order to contact a collection agency than to 
contact the patient's insurer, family member, or employer. 
In summary, the majority of psychologists did not feel it neces-
sary to obtain a client's consent when the client was imminently dan-
gerous to self or others or before sharing information with a col-
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TABLE 6 
Significance Levels from Newman-Keuls Post-hoc Analyses 
of Differences among the six Clinical Situations_· 
in the Conditions under which Information is Shared 
Situations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Employer Family Insurer Collection Colleague Patient 
Agency Dangerous 
Situations 
1 
2 n.s. 
3 .01 .05 
4 .01 .01 .01 
5 .01 .01 .01 .01 
6 .01 .01 .01 .01 n.s. 
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league for the purpose of consultation. The psychologists tended to 
be the most guarded about sharing information with a client's employer 
or family member, more so than with an insurance company o~:collection 
agency. 
The next group of questions concerned the psychologists' usual 
and standard practice in the management of confidentiality. The first 
of those questions (Question 5) asked: what percentage of psycholo-
gists say something about confidentiality from the outset of therapy? 
This was examined in two different ways in the survey. The first way 
was 1::1rough an examination of an item which asked psychologists 
whether or n0t they rou~inely ment~on something about confidentiality 
from their first contact with a patient (item 12). According to the 
response frequency of this item, 34.6% of the psychologists always say 
something about confidentiality from their first contact with a 
patient, 23.4% almost always say something about it, 17.0%did so 
"sometimes," 16.0% almost never say anything about confidentiality 
from the out~et, and 5.9% never mention confidentiality from the out-
set. 
The second way this question was answered was according to 
whether the psychologists responded to item 13 (for those who say 
something about confidentiality from the outset) or to item 14 (for 
those who do not say anything about confidentiality from the outset) 
in the questionnaire. This is essentially a dichotomous version of 
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item 12. Based on this dichotomy, 61.2% of the psychologists said 
that they usually inform clients about confidentiality from the outset 
while 38.8% usually do not. 
The next question concerning the routine management of confiden-
tiality asked what is it that is usually said to clients about confi-
dentiality by psychologists who usually raise the issue from the out-
set of therapy. In item 13 of the survey, the respondents were asked 
to provide a brief written description of what they usually say if 
they do indeed say anything about confidentiality from the outset. 
Their open-ended responses were coded into three categories; 19.1% (or 
11.7% of the total sample) usually tell their clients from the outset 
that everything said in therapy is con=idential; 14.8% (or 9.05% of 
the total) allude to the existence of limits to confiaer.tiality, and 
66.1% (40.40% of total sample) usually spell out the limits to confi-
dentiality in a specific manner. 
Questi?n 7 investigated how many psychologists have experienced 
a change in their position on confidentiality and was assessed via a 
yes/no questionnaire item (item 15). Nearly half the sample (49.7%) 
indicated a change in their positions. Of those who have changed 
their position on confidentiality, 78.3% have changed towards a posi-
tion of favoring more disclosure. A content analysis revealed a num-
ber of reasons for making such a change. The Tarasoff decision was 
the most fequently mentioned reason (N=22). Previous experience with 
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failure to clarify the limits of confidentiality from the outset with 
patients "at risk" or to inform their family members when that patient 
was at risk was cited second most frequently for why psychqlogists 
share confidential information more (N=14). Fear of malpractice and 
change in confidentiality laws (particularly the mandatory child abuse 
reporting law) were tied for the third most common reason (N=6). 
Studying law and/or ethics and personal maturation were other commonly 
mentioned reasons for changing to a position of greater disclosure 
(N=4). A smaller proportion of psychologist~ (20.7%) moved toward a 
position which favors less disclosure Chief among their reasons for 
doing so ·vas bad experien,·.E> with breaches of confidentiality in the 
past (N=£). Moving to a ~tate which has privileged communication 
(N=2) waE cited as the second most common reason. 
Factors Influencing K~9wle1g~ and Ha~agement 
Privileged Communication. Question 8 asked whether or not the 
accuracy of~ psychologist's definition of privileged communication is 
affected by privileged communication status or by a prior breach con-
fidentiality. In this regard, it was hypothesized that psychologists 
without privilege as well as those who have breached confidentiality 
will have more accurate definitions of the term "privileged communica-
tion." Befor~ addressing this question, however, the privileged com-
munication variable had to be receded into three levels, thus creating 
three groups of psychologists. Group 1 (N=91) contained psychologists 
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in states which have had privilege for a while (Illinois, Pennsylva-
nia, and Georgia). Group 2 (N=53) contained psychologists from states 
which do not have privilege (West Virginia and South Carol~na). Group 
3 (N=44) contained psychologists from two states (Iowa and Vermont) 
which recently acquired privileged communication. 1 The hypothesis was 
tested using a 3 (privilege status) by 2 (previous breach yes/no) 
ANOVA of privileged communication definition scores. The main effect 
for privilege status was not significant, I (2,163) = 0.02, n.s .. 
However, there was a significant main effect for the breach variable, 
I (1,163) = 4.00, £ < .05. Those who did have to breach confidential-
ity in the past had a significantly more accurate definition (~=0.80) 
than those who have not had to break confidentiality(~= 0.48). How-
ever, even a score of 0.80 meant that the psychologists did not pro-
vide very accurate defintions. The interaction was not significant. 
The next question (Question 9) concerned whether the _accuracy in 
the knowledge of one's privilege is affected by privilege status 
itself. There were no predictions. This was examined using a one-way 
ANOVA. The independent variable was, of course, privilege status 
(those who have it, those who do not, and those who just recently were 
granted it). The dependent variable was based on the psychologists' 
responses to item 34 which asked them to rate on a 5-point Likert 
scale how sure they were that they had privileged communication in 
l The recent changes in the privilege laws of these two states have 
been included in Appendix A. 
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their state. The dependent variable was formed by creating an error 
score for each subject, using the same error score method as in previ-
ous analyses. 
The results from the one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect 
for privileged communication status, I (2,183) = 5.56, E < .01. The 
mean error scores for the psychologists with privileged communication, 
those without it, and those who recently were granted it were 0.65, 
0.88, and 1.40 respectively. A Neuman-Keuls post hoc pair-wise com-
parison of the means indicated that those who had just received privi-
lege (Iowa and Vermont), were significantly less aware of their privi-
lege status than those psychologists who have had privilege for a 
while, (Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Georgia), g, (3,183)= 0.75, 
£,<.01, or those who do not have privilege (West Virginia and South 
Carolina), g, (2,183)= 0.65, £,<.01. The difference in accuracy of 
knowledge of privilege status between the latter two groups was not 
significant, g, (2,183)= 0.23, g.~. As a total sample, however, the 
psychologists were aware of their privilege status, having a total 
group mean error score of only 0.89, indicating that they were less 
than one likert scale point away in the accuracy of their knowledge of 
their privilege status. 
The next issue was whether privilege status affects how a psy-
chologist routinely manages confidentiality (Question 10). Two 
hypotheses were advanced. First, it was predicted that psychologists 
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without privilege would be more likely to inform about confidentialty 
from the outset of therapy. This was tested in a one-way ANOVA based 
on responses to item 12. The analysis revealed a nearly s~gnificant 
effect for privilege status, E (2,179) = 2.58, p = .079. The psychol-
ogists who have had privilege for a while were the most likely to 
inform of confidentiality from from the outset (~= 3.85), those with-
out privilege were the next likely to (~=3.66), and those were 
recently granted privilege were the least likely to routinely mention 
confidentiality from the outset (~=3.32). 
The second :1ypothesis predicted that psychologists who do not 
have privilege will be mure explicit about the limits of confidential-
ity. This was tested by a one-way ANOVA with privilege status as the 
independent variable. Their coded responses to an open-ended item 
(item 13) regarding what they say about confidentiality from the out-
set of therapy served as the dependent variable. Although the psy-
chologists who have had privilege for a while (~=2.58) as well as 
those who were recently granted it (~=2.50) were more explicit about 
the limits of confidentiality than those without privilege (~=2.25), 
this difference was not significant, EC2,112)=1.79, g.~. It should be 
noted that on the average, all three groups of psychologists at least 
allude to the existence of limits of confidentiality (which a score of 
2.00 would indicate), and tended to be explicit about the limits 
(score of 3.00). 
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Previous Breach of Confidentiality. The breach variable was 
recoded into three levels. The first level contained psychologists who 
indicated that a previous breach of confidentiality had afzected the 
therapy (N=12 or 6.6%). The second level contained psychologists who 
reported a previous breach that did not affect the therapy (N=35 or 
19.3%), and the third level contained psychologists who had not 
breached confidentiality in the past (N=134 or 74%). 
Question 11 asked if a previous breach of confidentiality sensi-
tized psychologists in any way to be more familiar with their state 
laws. The dependent variable in this one-way ANOVA was created by 
adding together the error ~cores for each of the Illinois psycholo-
gists. It was predicted that the psychologists who have had to break 
confidentiality would be more acquainted with the laws in their 
respective states and have lower error scores as a result. This 
hypothesis was not supported, f(2,38)= 0.19, n.s. In fact, the psy-
chologists who had to breach confidentiality in the past and found 
that the breach affected the therapy had the highest mean error scores 
(~=1.20). Those who made a breach and experienced no effect (~=0.93) 
as well as those who never had to breach confidentilaity (~=1.05) had 
lower error scores. 
Two questions regarding the relationship between a previous 
breach of confidentiality and the routine management of confidential-
ity were explored. The first (Question 12) concerned the relationship 
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between a breach and a change in position on confidentiality. It was 
predicted that there would be a relationship between the two. This 
was examined in a chi-square test where the marginals were breach 
(breach which affected therapy, breach which had no effect, and no 
breach) and whether or not their position on confidentiality had 
2 
changed (yes/no). The results were non-significant, J( (2)=2.94, 
n.s. and thus did not support the hypothesis. 
A further question concerned the relationship between a breach 
and what or when psychologists tell their clients about confidential-
ity (Question 13). It was hypothesized that psychologists who have 
had to breach confidentiality in the past will be more likely to say 
something about confidentiality from the outset of therapy. The 
results of the ANDVA were non-significant, F (2,172)=0.18, n.s. 
It was predicted that psychologists who had breached confiden-
tiality would be more explicit in informing their clients of the lim-
its of confi0entiality. This was tested in a one-way ANOVA of coded 
responses to item 13. The analysis yielded a significant effect, E 
(2,108) = 3.90, £<.05. Based on a Newman-Keuls post hoc comparison 
of means, those who breached confidentiality and it affected therapy 
(~=2.86) were significantly more explicit about the limits of confi-
dentiality than those who never breached confidentiality (~=2.10). 
Those who breached confidentiality but where it did not affect treat-
ment (~=2.55), were not significantly different from the other two 
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groups. When the breach did affect therapy, the psychologists who 
made such a breach were the most explicit about the limits of confi-
dentiality when seeing a client for the first time. Those psycholo-
gists who had broken confidentiality in the past but who found that 
the breach did not affect the treatment were the least likely to spec-
ify the limits of confidentiality, while those with no "breach experi-
ence" fell somewhere inbetween. 
Theoretical Orientation. Question 14 concerned the relationship 
between a psychologist's theoretical orientation and what or when a 
client is told about confidentiali"-Y. It was predicted that the psy-
chodynamic psychologists would be less likely to mention anything 
about confidentiality from the outset of therapy, and less likely to 
be explicit about the limits of confidentiality if they did bring the 
issue up. This was tested in a one-way ANOVA of scores to item 12 (in 
the first analysis for when confidentiality was mentioned), and to 
coded reponses to item 13 (for what was said regarding confidential-
ity). Both analyses contained contrasts which allowed for the compar-
ison of the psychodynamic psychologists with the other three orienta-
tions since specific predictions were made based on such a 
distinction. The results from both analyses were non-significant. In 
the first analysis which produced a non-significant planned compari-
son, IC1,177)= 0.24, g.~., the cognitive behaviorists were the most 
likely to mention something about confidentiality from the outset 
(~=3.86) followed by the psychodynamic clinicians (~=3.64). The beha-
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viorists (~=3.50) and the humanists (~=3.40) were the least likely to 
mention confidentiality from the outset. Because this analysis was 
not significant, however, these differences may be due to chance 
alone. 
The second analysis, which also produced a non-significant plan-
ned comparison, E (1, 177) = 0.25, g.~., indicated that the psychody-
namic clinicians did not differ from the other psychologists in terms 
of what they say about confidentiality when it is mentioned at the 
beginning of therapy. The humanists were the least explicit about the 
limits of ccnfidentiality (~=2.14) and the behaviorists were the most 
explicit (~=2. 60). ,\gain, because the anai.ysis was not significant, 
these results may be due to chance alone. 
To summarize this section, while privilege status did not affect 
the accuracy of psychologists' kno\vledge of the term "privileged com-
munication," it did affect their knowledge of whether or not they had 
privileged c~mmunication in their state of practice. Psychologists 
from states which were recently granted privilege were significantly 
less aware of their privilege status than the other psychologists. 
There was a trend for privilege status to affect when confidentiality 
was mentioned. Those who have had privilege for a while were more 
likely to mention something about confidentiality from the outset. 
Although a previous breach of confidentiality did not affect psycholo-
gists' knowledge of state confidentiality statutes, it did affect the 
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accuracy with which they could define the term "privileged communica-
tion." In addition, although a previous breach was not related to 
when confidentiality was brought up, it was related to how ~xplicit 
psychologists were about the limits of confidentiality. A previous 
breach was not significantly related to a change in position on confi-
dentiality. Those who reported breaches confidentiality which 
affected the therapy were more explicit than those who never breached 
confidentiality in the past. Theoretical orientation did not seem to 
affect either when confidentiality is brought up, or how explicit a 
psychologist might be about the limits of confidentiality. 
Factors Influenci~ Soecific Management 
Psychologists' handling of confidentiali~y was further explored 
by presenting the respondents with two vignettes of clinical situ-
ations in which confidentiality wqs a particularly salient issue: 
dangerousness, and potential court testimony. For each vignette, 
respondents ~ere asked to describe in an open-ended manner how they 
would handle each situation. They were also presented with a number 
of potential responses to the two situations and asked to rate the 
likelihood that they would use such a response on a scale of 1 (defi-
nitely would not) to 5 (definitely would). The first vignette 
described a client who was potentially harmful towards self or others. 
Respondents' ratings to three items regarding the handling of confi-
dentiality in this situation were analyzed in order to examine the 
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relationship between theoretical orientation, target of threat (i.e., 
self or others) and their responses. The psychologists' responses to 
the items were examined in three separate analyses. In eac~ analysis, 
a 2 (harmful to self/others) by 4 (psychodynamic, cognitive-behav-
ioral, behavioral, and humanistic) ANOVA was conducted. 
The first of the three analyses concerned whether psychologists' 
tendency to inform about the limits of confidentiality (item 2) 
changes as a function of theoretical orientation or whether or not a 
client is threatening harm towards self as opposed to others (Question 
15). It was predicted that the psychodynamic psychologists would be 
less inclined to inform of limits; in addition, it was predicted that 
all of the psychologists would be more likely to inform of limits when 
the patient was threater1ing harm towards others. The ANOVA yielded 
non-significant results for both main effects CE(3,176)=0.99, g.~. for 
theoretical orientation, and EC1,176)=0.99, g.~. for the other/self 
variable) and for the interaction EC3,176)=0.525,g.~.. Thus contrary 
to predictio~, the psychologists' tendency to inform of the limits of 
confidentiality was not affected by theoretical orientation or whether 
or not the client was threatening harm towards self or towards others. 
The second analysis examined whether psychologists' tendency to 
say that everything was confidential (item 3) was affected by whether 
or not the client was threatening harm towards self or others, or 
according to theoretical orientation (Question 16). Asking the ques-
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tion in this slightly different manner yielded a different result. 
Although there were still no significant main effects for orientation, 
[(3,168)=0.27, g.!·• or the other versus self variable, [(~168)=0.76, 
g.!·• there was a significant interaction E (3,168) = 3.86, £=.01. 
The psychodynamic clinicians were more likely to say that everything 
was confidential when the client was threatening harm towards others 
(~=2.96) but were less likely to say everything was confidential when 
the client was threatening harm towards self (~=2.12). The clinicians 
of the other three orientations (cognitive-behavioral, behavioral, and 
humanistic), however, were leFs likely to say that everything was con-
fLdential when thE client was threatening harm towards others (~=1.94, 
Z.00, and 2.27 respectively) than when threatening harm towards self 
(~=2.75, 2.33, and 2.78 respectively). In each case, a mean less than 
3.00 indicated that the psychologist tended to disagree with the idea 
that t~e client should be told that everything is confidential. The 
lower the mean, the more strongly they disagreed with the idea. 
The third analysis (Question 17) examined the role of these same 
two variables on psychologists' tendency to say nothing at all about 
confidentiality at first in the hope that the client would say more 
about what it is that is troubling him (item 4). The main effect for 
orientation was not significant, [(3,170)=1.48, g·!·· There was a 
main effect for other versus self, E (1,170) = 10.92, £<.001 with the 
psychologists more likely to say nothing about confidentiality when 
the harm was threatened towards self (~=2.28) than when the harm was 
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threatened towards others (~=1.67). The interaction was not signifi-
cant, EC3,17)=1.11, n.s. A mean score of 2.00 indicated that a psy-
chologist disagreed with the idea of saying nothing at all _about con-
fidentiality to the client. A mean score of 1.00 indicated strong 
disagreement, and a score of 3.00 indicated neither agreement nor dis-
agreement. Thus in the previous analysis, psychologists did not think 
it was a good idea to say nothing about confidentiality to a dangerous 
patient, but felt stronger in their conviction when the client threat-
ened harm towards someone else than when he threatened to hurt him-
self. 
There were five psychologists who ~ook a position of absolute 
confidentiality in their responses to the vignette in which the man 
was threatening harm to\Jards others. The responses of these psycholo-
gists were examined qualitatively to provide some insight into their 
rationale for such an extreme position (Question 18). All five were 
psychodynamic in orientation. One psychologist wrote in his response 
to this vignette that "confidentiality is an insignificant issue 
here." He felt that the client's presentation in this first session 
was a "transferential issue and one of resistance." He felt that this 
needed to be interpreted as such and that he as the therapist should 
not be "seduced" into making confidentiality an issue. Another psy-
chologist felt that the client should be encouraged to speek freely 
about his impulses both present and past, and would not mention any-
thing at all about confidentiality in this first session out of fear 
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that doing so would curb the client's willingness to discuss his 
impulses. Still yet another psychologist would focus on the diffi-
culty in trusting a stranger. This psychologist would alsn·take the 
stance that if the client could not explore his feelings, then he as 
the therapist would refuse to work with him. In each case, the psy-
chologist interpreted the client's potential dangerousness as symbolic 
of some other issue (e.g., transference, resistance, or trust). The 
issue of confidentiality and how it was to be managed was not men-
tioned with the client apparently because it was thought not to be the 
"real" issue. 
In summary, the management of coniidentiality in the clinical 
situation in which a patient was potentially harmful was influenced 
both by the target of the threat and by the psychologists' theoretical 
orientations. Although the psychologists would tend to say something 
about confidentiality regardless of the target of the threat, they 
were more likely to say something when the patient was potentially 
harmful towards others. Although the majority of psychologists would 
not maintain absolute confidentiality, the psychodynamic psychologists 
were "not sure" whether or not they would maintain absolute confiden-
tiality when the patient was potentially harmful towards others. All 
of the five psychologists who would "definitely" tell the patient who 
was potentially harmful towards others that everything was confiden-
tial, were psychodynamic in orientation. They did not view the danger 
threat as the "real issue," but rather as one of transference. 
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The other clinical vignette presented a situation in which a 
psychologist might be asked to testify about a patient in court. 
Question 19 concerned whether the handling of confidential~ty in this 
situation was influenced by the client's level of functioning, the 
psychologist's theoretical orientation, or privilege status. A 2 
(high/low functioning) by 4 (psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioral, 
behavioral, or humanistic) by 3 (privilege status) ANOVA was conducted 
on the likelihood that the respondents would assure their client (in 
the vignette) that the law protects them from a subpoena. The analy-
sis yie~_ded a significant main effect for privilege status, .£:(2, 165 )= 
14.19, :2<. 001. As predicted, those _.:-sychologists who ha•'e had privi-
lege for a while (~=2.62) as well those who were just granted it 
(~=2.50) were more likely to assure the client that the law protects 
from a subpoena than would those psychologists who do not have privi-
lege (~=1. 37). In each case, however, the psychologists tendnd not 
give the assurance that the law would protect from a subpoena. Con-
trary to wha~ was predicted, however, there was no significant effect 
for either the client's level of functioning, .£:(1,54)=0.80, g.~., or 
the psychologist's theoretical orientation, .£:(3,54)=0.08, n.s .. The 
interactions were not tested because of empty cells. 
The second question pertaining to privileged communication and 
the client's level of functioning (Question 20) was whether psycholo-
gists with the low functioning patient would be more likely to consult 
with a lawyer (item 25), and whether such a decision would be based on 
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privilege status. A 2 (high/low functioning) by 3 (privilege status) 
ANOVA was conducted. The analysis yielded no significant effects_ for 
level of functioning, I(1,167)=0.39, ~·~··privilege I(2,16J)=2.27, 
~·~··or for the interactions. Regardless of the level of functioning 
of the client, most of the psychologists (73.7%) would consult with a 
lawyer in such a clinical situation, while only 14.6% would not. 
In summary, privilege status seemed to be a factor which influ-
enced the management of the privileged communiction, child custody 
vignette. Those psychologists with privilege were more likely to tell 
their client that the law protects them from a subpoena. The decision 
to so inform the client was not affected by the client's level of 
functioning or the psychologist's theoretical orientation. 
Psychologists Opinions 9f Guidelines an~ Statutes 
Question 22 asked if psychologists would have differing views about 
how positively their state privilege laws affect their clinical woLk 
as a function of privilege status. It was predicted that psycholo-
gists with privilege would view their state laws as having a more 
positive impact. This hypothesis was tested using a one-way ANOVA of 
responses to an item (item 41) asking respondents to rate the impact 
of presence or absence of privilege on their clinical work on a scale 
of 1 (very negative impact) to 5 (very positive impact) with 3 indi-
cating "no impact." The analysis yielded a significant main effect 
for privilege status, I (2,167) = 18.77, p<.001. As predicted, those 
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who have had privilege for a while (~=3.87) as well as those who were 
just granted it (~=3.45) had more positive views of the impact of_ 
their state privilege laws on their clinical work than tho~e without 
privilege (~=2.87). Moreover, those psychologists with privilege saw 
their privilege status as having a positive impact on their work while 
those without privilege felt that their "no privilege" status had a 
negative impact on their clinical work. 
Because so few of the psychologists (26.5%) could provide accu-
rate definitions of the term "privileged communication," the above 
analysis was redone to include only those psychologists who were 
fatliliar with the term. The analysis w."ls still significant F (2,53) 
=6 . 7 9 , E. < . 0 1. 
Question 22 asked about the degr0e to which psychologists would 
approve of rm ethical guideline which recommends that clients be 
informed in advance of the limits of confidentiality. Based on a 
five-point L_ikert scale (where a score of "1" indicated strong disap-
proval and a score of 115 11 indicated strong approval) the psychologists 
as a group had a mean rating of 4.03, indicating their approval of the 
guideline. The majority of psychologists (70.8%) indicated either 
approval or strong approval, while only 10.8% indicated disapproval or 
strong disapproval. Contrary to prediction, theoretical orientation 
did not significantly affect the psychologists' opinions, 
EC3,180)=0.35, g.~. 
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The next question under this heading was designed to examine 
psychologists' opinions about the Tarasoff decision. Before doing so, 
however, it was important to find out if psychologists wera:familiar 
with the decision (Question 23). This was answered in item 54 in the 
survey; 48.6% of the psychologists reported being familiar or very 
familiar with the decision, while 12.4% were "not sure" if they had 
heard of the decision, and 38.9% were not familiar with the decision. 
The question only sought to determine if they were familiar enough 
with the decision to recognize it by name. Many respondents indicated 
that they might be familiar with the decision but could not recognize 
it: by name alone. Quest __ on 24 concerned the impact of this do'rision 
on their clinical work. Psychologists famil~ar with the decision were 
asked to rate its impact on a scale of 1 (very negative impact) to 5 
(Very positive impact) With a SCOre Of 3 signifying 11n0 impact-; II 46. 8°~ 
felt that the decision has had a pnsitive effect, 42.2% felt that 
there had been no impact, and 11.0% felt that the decision has had a 
negative eff~ct. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Return Rate and Representativeness of Sample 
Before discussing the relevance and meaning of the results, it 
seems prudent to examine the survey return rate. The overall return 
rate of 41.9% was quite close to the predicted (though conservative) 
estimate of a 40% return rate. The observed overall return rate is 
fel-~ to underestimate tre actual return -:-Ate. This underestimation 
probably occurred becau~e the initial su~veys were mailed bulk rate 
and as such were not fo~wa~ded to the psychologists whose addresses 
had changed, nor were they returned if they were not deliverable as 
addre.ssed. This problem was discovered because t:he "thank you I 
reminder" pos·c cards were mailed first class' and thus were forwarded 
to new addre~ses if forwarding addresses were available, or were 
returned if the addreses were unknown. When the post cards were 
returned as "address unknown," the return rate was adjusted accord-
ingly. A problem in determining the final return rate arose because 
of those psychologists who had moved and had a forwarding address; 
they received the post cards but not the survey. Of those undeter-
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mined number of psychologists, six wrote letters 1 expressing interest 
in participating in the survey. However, there is no way of knowing 
how many psychologists did not take the initiative to writ~~such a 
letter; these psychologists never received the survey, yet were con-
sidered to be "non-responders." While the return rate reached its 
predicted level, it needs to be underscored that a sizeable proportion 
of the total sample surveyed did not return the survey. For this rea-
son, inferences about the population of psychologists in the seven 
states must be made cautiously. There was a considerable range in 
return rate across states from a low of 28.3% in Vermont, to a high of 
69.0% in West Virginia. Exactly why these two states had such low and 
high rates respectively is not clear. 
The sampl~ of responders was compared with the total population 
of Register members on some of the demographic variables. This check 
was made to see of there might be some detectable bias in terms of who 
responded to the survey and who did not. In general, the sample was 
close to the parent population on all but the number of years of expe-
rience The sample registered approximately five more years of expe-
rience than the overall population. This was probably due to the fact 
that this survey was conducted between four and five years later than 
was the survey which gathered data on the population (Vandenbos, 
Stapp, & Kilburg, 1981). There did not seem to be any significant 
~ 
two each from Illinois and West Virginia, and one each from Penn-
sylvania and South Carolina 
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demographic differences between the present sample and the population 
which would suggest a demographic bias in terms of who responded to 
the survey and who did not. 
Knowledge of Confidentiality 
The research revealed some interesting information regarding 
psychologists' knowledge about confidentiaity. The vast majority 
(93.5%) knew what the term "confidentiality" meant, which of course is 
a key definition to know as it greatly affects responses to the rest 
of the quest-ionnaire. Because it is a concept frequently discussed in 
the area of psychotherapy, it was not suprising that so many psycholo-
gists could define the term. 
Psychologists' definitions of "privileged communication" were 
much less accurate, with only 26.5% of them defining the term accu-
=->itely. This term is much more limited in scope than "confidential-
ity," in that the term applies only to the specific situation of tes-
timony in court. It is a legal term which is not as intrinsic to the 
domain of psychotherapy. Psychologists did have some understanding of 
what the term seemed to imply but they simply lacked the knowledge 
necessary to provide a technically accurate definition. It is note-
worthy that those psychologists who had to break confidentiality in 
the past had significantly more accurate definitions of the term. 
Perhaps some of those psychologists were subpoenaed. Yet even those 
psychologists who breached confidentiality in the past had rather 
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innaccurate definitions of the term. Nany of the psychologists had 
confused the terms "confidentiality" and "privileged communication." 
Typically they referred to the latter as the mere legal version of the 
former. This confusion is consistent with what Suarez and Balcanoff 
(1966) suspected when they polled psychiatrists about their privilege 
status. 
The psychologists in this study were generally aware of their 
privilege status even if they were largely unaware of how to define 
the concept. Using the error score system, they were less than one 
error score off (or c,ne poiEt on a five point Likert scale) in their 
ratings of whether or not they had privilege in th~ir state of prac-
tice. When these error scores are translated into percentages, 71.9% 
were accurately aware of their privilege status (using an error score 
of "1" or "0" as the criteria of awareness). Previous research which 
examined mental health professionals' knowledge of their privilege 
status (Suarez & Balcanoff, 1966; Swoboda et al 1978) found that 
roughly one fourth of their samples were unaware of their privilege 
status. These two studies were conducted in states where privilege 
had existed for a while. When the psychologists in the present study 
from the two states which were recently granted privilege were removed 
for the sake of comparison, the accuracy increased to 74.8%. Thus the 
psychologists' knowledge of their privilege status in this study is 
consistent with previous findings. 
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Psychologists in the present study were compared across states 
for the accuracy in their knowledge of their privilege status. It was 
not suprising that Iowa and Vermont were less accurate in their knowl-
edge of their privilege status since "privilege" is quite recent in 
these states. Of particular interest, however, is the fact that the 
psychologists from West Virginia were just as inaccurate in their 
knowledge of their privilege status as those from the two states whose 
privilege status had just changed. One possible explanation for this 
is that the return rate from West Virginia (69.0%) was substantially 
higher than aay other state. 2 Perhaps West Virginia reflects the over-
all population more accurately in terms oi knowledge about prjrilege 
status. It may be that the majority of psychologists from th~ other 
states who were not knowledgeable about confidentiality were less 
likely to participate in the survey. 
The last of the issues to be discussed regarding psychologists' 
knowledge about confidentiality is their general awareness of their 
state confidentiality laws. Only Illinois psychologists were studied, 
and as a group, they were quite aware of their state confidentiality 
laws. They were the most uncertain about the legality of breaking 
confidentiality in order to answer further questions from an insurance 
company. Perhaps this is because this situation occurs less fre-
quently than that of client's a family member or employer contacting a 
::2. 
and higher than the return rates in either of the two previously 
mentioned studies 
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psychologist. 
Management of Confidentiality 
As a group the psychologists would require the client's complete 
consent and knowledge before sharing information with a family member 
or employer. This is not suprising since ethical and legal guidelines 
are rather clear on this issue. It might have been helpful, however, 
to have qualified the item in the survey which dealt with sharing 
information with a family member by specifying the age of the client 
in question (i.e., child or adult). Psychologists who work predomi-
nantly with children may be less inclined to require their (child) 
client's consent before sharing information with a family member 
(i.e., parent). A striking finding was that 14.6% of the psycholo-
gists indicated that they would never share informatioL with a family 
member of the client under any circumstance, even with the client'f 
consent and knowledge. A similar finding occurred when sharing infor-
mation with an employer, in that 24.9% of the psychologists would 
never share information with the client's employer under any circum-
stance. The psychologists' refusal to share information was not pres-
ent in the other four situations. Perhaps the psychologists who would 
not share the information did not consider that the client may have 
wanted them to share the information with a family member or employer. 
The issue of contacting a collection agency to recover money 
from an unpaid bill left the psychologists divided. Many (37.4%) 
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indicated that they would never contact a collection agency. Perhaps, 
as some psychologists wrote, they felt that it was a therapeutic error 
to have allowed a bill to amass, and thus did not pursue the collec-
tion of the bill. Many psychologists (35.6%) would first notify the 
client of the intention to contact a collection agency, but would not 
require the client's consent. Only a minority (6.9%) would require 
the client's knowledge and consent. That this is such a small percent 
makes sense because probably few ex-clients would give their consent 
for the psychologist to contact a collection agency, especially 
clients who are not paying their bills. There do s•~em to be many psy-
che logists (20 .1%) who ·.;auld contact tho' collection agency without 
first attempting to no~ify the client that such an action might be 
taken. This would seen: to be a less desirable method of handling the 
situation since it is not clear whether this is either ethical or 
::.egal. Surely the act of first informing the client would appear to 
be a more ethical way of managing the situation. This may even encour-
age the clie~t to pay the bill, thus avoiding the process of of con-
tacting the collection agency altogether. It may be that situations 
related to insurance or a collection agency generated the most uncer-
tainty since they are situations which may occur less frequently. 
Moreover, the ethical and legal guidelines governing the disclosure to 
these sources are less clear. 
Although the issue of whether or not to break confidentiality 
when a client was imminently dangerous also does not occur too fre-
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quently, the ethical and legal guidelines governing this have been 
more widely publicized. The psychologists were willing to break con-
fidentiality when a client was imminently dangerous; this WftS not 
suprising in the light of the Tarasoff case. In addition, most of the 
seven states contain specific clauses in their confidentiality laws 
which make it legal (although never mandatory) to break confidential-
ity whenever a client is imminently dangerous to self or others. 
Still, the psychologists preferred to inform the patient first before 
making a breach in this situation. This appears to be a more desira-
ble method of handling such a sit:uation. This is also consistent with 
what Roth and Meisel (1977) recommended when dealing with a dangerous 
pat~ent. Sharing information with a colleague is also an instance 
where it is legal in most states to break confidentiality. Indeed, 
more psychologists in the present study were willing to break confi-
dentiality without the client's knowledge in order to consult with a 
colleague than in any other of the six clinical situations. The 
majority of ~he psychologists (59.5%) felt it unnecessary to inform 
the client when they consulted with a colleague about them. Appar-
ently they felt it to be in the client's best interest to not inform 
them of this. Might they fear that it would undermine the client's 
confidence in them? It will be interesting to see if the psycholo-
gists' position changes over time in this situation since the APA's 
most recent recommendation (1984) that all clients be informed if a 
psychologist consults with a colleague for the purpose of discussing 
that client. 
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The survey revealed a wide range of attitudes and behaviors 
regarding the psychologists' routine management of confidentiality. 
The trend among the ethical guidelines is for clients to be_better 
informed about the limits of confidentiality. This was underscored 
both in the speciality guidelines and most recently (APA, 1984) in the 
recommendation that clients be informed when information is to be 
shared with a consultant or supervisor. The sample appears to be 
equally divided when examining their behaviors in light of this trend. 
Nearly half of the sample (49.5%) indicated that they routinely either 
alluded to, or mentioned explicit limits to confidentiality from the 
outs~t of therapy. Th-Ls is in sharp contrast to previous research 
(Wis!, 1978) in which a survey of primarily psychiatrists in Califor-
nia ~ev~aled that only 14.5% would discuss confidentiality from the 
outset. In the preseDt study, at the 49.7% of the sample who reported 
that their position en confidentiality had changed over the years, 78% 
(or 39% of the total sample) have changed towards a position of 
informing tP~ir clients more about the limits of confidentiality. 
In contrast to those psychologists who mentioned the limits of 
confidentiality from the outset, the other half of the sample (50.5%) 
appeared to take a different stand on the management of confidential-
ity; 38.8% of the total sample of psychologists say nothing about con-
fidentiality from the outset, while an additional 11.7% tell their 
clients that everything is confidential. This divergence in direction 
between two equally large groups of psychologists is cause for con-
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cern. The most widely recognized governing body of psychology, the 
APA, clearly is moving in the direction of more informed consent, and 
more explanation to clients about the limits of confidentiality. The 
fact that half of the psychologists do not seem to reflect such a 
position could create many ethical and legal complications in the 
years to come. In a general way, this survey verifies what is 
reflected in the clinical literature; that is, there is much variabil-
ity among psychologists about the management of confidentiality. 
Attempts to explain the differences among psychologists were 
made first by asking the psychologists why they may have changed their 
position on confidentiality. The reasons whicn the psychologists gave 
for a change in their position on confidentility were consistent with 
some of the factors or variables suggested in the literature, and this 
reinforced the importance of studying them in a systematic way in the 
present research. The Tarasoff decision was the most frequently men-
tioned reason for a change in position about confidentiality. Previ-
ous personal experiences with breaches of confidentiality (or failure 
to breach confidentiality when it was warranted) was the second most 
commonly cited reason. Fear of malpractice suits and privilege status 
were also given as reasons. 
Not all of the factors had the predicted effect on the routine 
management of confidentiality. Privilege status did not have the 
effect which was predicted. This was somewhat suprising given that 
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47% of the psychologists reported that they had had a personal experi-
ence much like the one portrayed in the privileged communication vig-
nette. There are a couple of explanations, however, for why privilege 
status may have had little effect on the routine management of confi-
dentiality. First, perhaps privilege truly represents only a small 
aspect of confidentiality and thus really has little to do with the 
routine management of confidentiality. The fact that many psycholo-
gists could not accurately define the term really was not an issue 
since a re-analysis using only those psychologists who understood the 
term did not char:ge the results. This is by no means to be construed 
that privilege has no effect and theref~re mi~ht just as well be rbo-
lished. More will be said about the concept's importance when di3-
cussing the privilege vignet'te. 
A previous breach of confidentiality did affect the management 
of confidentiality, but not in the broad, general way which was pre-
dicted. First, it was not significantly associated with a change in 
position on confidentialty. Indeed, based on the reasons which the 
psychologists provided, a change in position on confidentiality was 
less likely to occur as a result of personal clinical experience 
(N=22) than it was as a result of changes in laws, court decisions, or 
fears of malpractice (N=36). Personal experience with a breach in 
confidentiality did not affect when confidentiality was raised with 
new clients, regardless of what affect the previous breach had on the 
therapy (of a previous client). A previous breach of confidentiality 
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did have an effect on what was said about confidentiality when the 
issue was raised from the outset of therapy. As predicted, those who 
breached confidentiality and it affected therapy, were the ~ost 
explicit about the limits of confidentiality. Perhaps this means that 
they may be no more likely than the other psychologists in the fre-
quency with which they think to bring up the issue, but once they do, 
they are more explicit about the limits of confidentiality based on 
their past experience. 
The fact that theoretical orientation had no significant differ-
ential effect on wl1at and when confidentiality is routinely mentioned 
was somewhat suprising. lt appears to run contrary to the clinical 
writings of the psychodynamic theorists who advocate absolute confi-
dentiality. Perhaps the psychodynamic psychologists' report of their 
routine management of confidentiality is different from what they 
actually do in specific clinical situations. It was in the latter 
context that differences based on theoretical orientation occurred. 
Indeed many more of the psychodynamic writings have dealt with the 
management of specific clinical situations (Goldstein & Katz, 1962; 
Kubie, 1950; Langs, 1976; Mariner, 1967; Siegel, 1979; Uchill, 1978) 
than in the routine management of confidentiality (Kubie, 1950; Langs, 
1976). 
The psychodynamic psychologists had a different response to the 
self versus other variable than did the other psychologists. Three 
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questions were asked using theoretical orientation, and "self versus 
others" as the independent variables. Three different dependent vari-
ables were used: (a)tendency to inform about limits to co~fidential­
ity; (b)tendency to say that everything was confidential; and 
(c)tendency to say nothing at all about confidentiality. Although 
these questions may appear somewhat redundant, only (b) and (c) were 
significantly correlated (!=.50, £<.001) while the other correlations 
were near zero. 
The only analysis in which theoretical orientation played a sig-
nificant role was in the second analysis (b), the one which could be 
construed as the absolute confidentiality question. The "absolute" 
stance written about in the clinical literature was found in the pres-
ent research to a mild degree. Tae psychodynamic psychologists were 
not sure whether or not to maintain absolute confidentiality when a 
patient was potentially harmful toward others, whereas the other psy-
chologists were not as ambivalent; they would not say that everything 
was confidential. This difference may be explained by the construct 
of transference. Many of the psychodynamic clinicians wrote that when 
the patient was potentially harmful towards others, it was a manifes-
tation of transference. Perhaps these psychologists felt that poten-
tial harm towards others represented a transference issue which would 
be best handled by maintaining absolute confidentiality and interpret-
ing the transference. When the patient was potentially harmful 
towards self, however, this may represent to the psychodynamic psy-
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chologists more of a "real" threat and thus they were less likely to 
maintain absolute confidentiality than when the patient is harmful 
towards others. 
The fact that these orientation effects were discovered is par-
ticularly noteworthy since there was the possibility that they could 
have been "washed out" in the way in which orientation was coded for 
the data analysis. More than half of the sample (56.5%) initially 
indicated that they were eclectic. These "electics" were then recoded 
into the four main orientation categories. 
There were diffe~Pnces in the management of confidentiality when 
the Client was potenti~lly harmful towards self as opposed to poten-
tially harmful towards others. The psychologists as a group were more 
likely to say something about confidentiality in the presence of the 
client who might be dangerous towards others as compared to towards 
self. This represents a quantitative difference only, because they 
were inclined to say something about confidentiality regardless of 
which type of patient they were working with. 
The issue of whether there has been a shift in values on the 
part of psychologists in the wake of Tarasoff is difficult to deter-
mine. There are no pre-Tarasoff measures available to see if there 
were inherent "self versus others" descrepancies prior to Tarasoff. 
Thus effects can only be loosely inferred. In the present study, the 
Tarasoff decision was cited the most frequently as the reason why a 
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change in position on confidentiality had occurred. In terms of the 
management of confidentiality in specific clinical situations, the 
present study revealed what might be construed as a quanti~ative as 
opposed to a qualitative shift in values in the management of a Tara-
soft-like situation. That is, as a group, the psychologists would not 
guarantee absolute confidentiality, but would say something about con-
fidentiality regardless of whether the patient was potentially harmful 
to self or others. They just would be more sure to say something 
about confidentiality when the patient was harmful to others, perhaps 
out of fear of a lawsuit. There was no rrdical shift, with rampant, 
liberal warni·1gs to third parties when the patient was harmful tmvards 
others as Roth (1983) had feared. 
A more potent Tarasoff eff~ct might have been discovered in the 
present study had a more true Tarasof± situation been presented in the 
questionnaire. It needs to be underscored that in the vignette, the 
client never actually said that he intended to hurt himself or someone 
else; it had only been hinted at. As a result, in contrast to the 
Tarasoff case, an imminent danger was never clearly established. 
Although privilege status did not seem to be a factor in the 
routine management of confidentiality, it did affect the management of 
a specific clinical situation, that of possibly having to testify in 
court. The fact that the psychologists with privilege were more 
likely to assure the client in the privilege vignette that the law 
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protects from a subpoena, suggests that the psychologists may have a 
better understanding of the concept of privilege than was initially 
thought to be the case (based on their definitions of the term). It 
was interesting that regardless of privilege status, the psychologists 
tended to shy away from the idea of telling the client that the law 
protects from a subpoena. The influence of the law in clinical deci-
sion making was suggested in that 73.6% of the psychologists would 
consult with a lawyer in a situation like the one presented in the 
privileged communication vignette. They would do so regardless of 
privilege status or the client's level of functioning. 
Although it was unclear that privilege status had any measurable 
effect on the management of confidentiality in the present research, 
the psychologists felt that having privilege had a positive impact on 
their clinical work, while those without privilege felt that absence 
of privilege affected their clinical work in a negative way. Perhaps 
they felt that it is better to have a privilege if given a choice, 
even if they are not able to define the concept or even if it appears 
to matter little in the course of their day-to-day clinical work. 
Psychologists Opinions of Guidelines and Statutes 
Psychologists' opinions of ethical guidelines and legal deci-
sions in general suggest that they desire established guidelines to 
aid them in the conduct of their clinical work. Although only half of 
the sample either alluded to or made specific mention of the limits of 
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confidentiality from the outset of therapy, 70.8% of the sample 
approved or strongly approved of an ethical guideline which recommends 
that clients be informed in advance of the limits of confiqentiality, 
which is of course already an ethical guideline (APA, 198la). The 
fact that they strongly approved of a guideline which was discrepant 
with their own behaviors speaks to their desire to have some direction 
in dealing with the often confusing issues surrounding confidential-
ity. Similarly, although much had been written about the problems 
with the Tarasoff decision (which appear to be quite valid), half of 
ttose psychologists familiar with the decision fe]t that the decision 
has had a positive impact on their clinical work. Perhaps they felt 
comforted knowing that in the anxiety arousing situation of treating a 
dangerous patient, there is ·a clear precedent of how to act in a way 
that is legally sanctioned and that provides some protection for soci-
ety. 
Summary and Direction for Future Research 
The purpose of the present study was to gather data regarding 
psychologists' knowledge about confidentiality as well as how they 
manage confidentiality in routine and specific clinical situations. 
This study revealed that psychologists understood what the term "con-
fidentiality" meant, but were less accurate in their understanding of 
the concept "privileged communication." They were generally aware of 
their privilege status and state confidentiality laws. 
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The psychologists were equally divided about how to routinely 
manage confidentiality. Half of the psychologists either allude to or 
are explicit about the limits of confidentiality with thei~·patients 
from the outset of therapy. At the same time, half of the psycholo-
gists either say nothing about confidentiality from the outset, or 
else say that everything is confidential. 
This research demonstrated empirically that variables such as 
privilege status, previous breach of confidentiality, theoretical ori-
entation, and the nature of a client's potential dangerousness all 
play a role in t;l6 management of confidentiality. Privilege status 
did not have the effect ,m the routine managemunt of confidentiality 
which was predicted. However, a mild privilege effect was observ~d in 
how psychologists managed confidentiality in the privileged communica-
tion vignette. Not suprisingly, psychologists with privilege were 
more likely than those without it to tell the client that ~he law pro-
tects them from a subpoena. Even in this situation, however, few of 
the psychologists would tell the client that the law protects them 
from such a subpoena. 
The issue of whether or not privileged communucation makes any 
difference in the psychotherapist- patient relationship has been 
raised before (Chafee, 1943; Yale Law Journal, 1962). The legal pro-
fession has historically taken the position that there is no evidence 
to suggest that privileged communication is beneficial in such a rela-
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tionship. Ironically, it has also been the legal profession (Yale Law 
Journal, 1962) which has suggested that privileged communication prob-
ably has no discernable effect because patients probably dq- not know 
whether or not they have privilege. It would be of key importance to 
study the effects of privilege status from the patient's perspective 
before deciding that privileged communication has no effect on the 
therapist-patient relationship. In the only known study which exam-
ined the effects of levels of confidentiality on client self-disclo-
sure, clients disclosed more when more confidentiality was assured 
(Woods & McNamara, 1980). It would be important to study the effects 
of a client's knowledge of privilege status on level of self di~·clo­
sure. One other note of caution about interprLting these findihgs has 
to do with the nomothetic nature of this study. This study examined a 
large group of psychologi.sts. It did not study privileged comm·,mica-
tion in depth. It would be very int~resting to talk with psycholo-
gists for whom court testimony about a case and the need to maintain 
privilege was a real issue. The role of privilege could then be more 
thoroughly examined. 
A previous breach of confidentiality affected the routine man-
agement of confidentiality. Although it did not affect when confiden-
tiality was brought up with a client, psychologists who breached con-
fidentiality in the past where it affected the therapy were more 
explicit about the limits of confidentiality once the issue was 
brought up. The "breach" variable was not studied very thoroughly in 
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this research. Future research could more closely examine the this 
variable more closely. There are numerous research questions which 
could be addressed. The type of breach could be more fully~explored. 
Who was it that the psychologist contacted which created the breach? 
Was the breach made without the client's prior knowledge? Are there 
different breach effects when working with a child-client as compared 
to the adult client? ~1ore open-ended, exploratory questions could be 
asked about the psychologists' rationale for breaking confidentiality 
and what they feel the ultimate effect was on the therapy. Did the 
breach have a positive or negative impact? What was the effect from 
the client's perspoective? Did it foster a 1'0.eling of greater safety 
and Sdcurity, or undermine .1 sense of trust in the therapist? These 
are but a few of the many un-answered questions which could be 
explo~ed with this one variable alone. 
Although theoretical orientation did net seem to affect how psy-
chologists routinely managed confidentiality, it did affect how it was 
managed when a client was potentially dangerous. As predicted, the 
psychodynamic psychologists tended to take more of an absolute confi-
dentiality position with the client who was potentially dangerous 
towards others than did the other psychologists. From a qualitative 
analysis of their responses, it was inferred that they viewed such 
potential danger as a manifestation of transference which required 
interpretation. It would be interesting in future research to compare 
psychologists of more "pure" orientations to see if the orientation 
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effects become more pronounced. Asking psychologists for a more 
detailed description of their orientation might help to further clar-
ify (for research purposes) what their theoretical orientatjons are. 
It would also be interesting to include a group of "eclectics" for the 
sake of comparison since this latter group comprises such a large pro-
portion of psychologists. 
The theoretical orientation findings raised some questions about 
the management of the dangerous patient. The study in general showed 
that psychologists manage confidentiality a little differently based 
on the type of danger (i.e. dangerous to self or others). Although in 
either case the nsychologists would tell the dangerous patient about 
the limits of confidentiality, they were more likely to do so when the 
patient was dangerous towards others. However, because the psychody-
namic psychologists were not sure whether or not to maintain absolute 
confidentiality in such a situation, important questions need to be 
addressed in future research. At what point do psychologists deter-
mine that a danger exists? How does the assessment of danger affect 
what and when a client is told about confidentiality, or when a breach 
is likely to be made? What are the effects of maintaining absolute 
confidentiality when a patient is potentially dangerous (to either 
self or others)? Does this indeed change the risk of a dangerous act 
occurring? Might it be that the psychodynamic psychologists do not 
maintain absolute confidentiality once the presence of a danger is 
etsablished? If however, they do maintain an absolute stance in the 
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face of an actual danger, how do these psychologists manage the immi-
nently dangerous patient? 
This research was the first comprehensive, large scale study to 
examine the management of confidentiality by mental health profession-
als. It has demonstrated that there are specific factors which affect 
how confidentiality is managed. Each of these variables now must be 
explored in more detail in future research. 
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CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED comtuNICATION EXCERPTS 
Of the seven states which will be included in this survey, three 
states (Illinois, Georgia, and Pennslyvania) contain liberal privi-
leged communication statutes. Four other states (Iowa, South Caro-
lina, West Virginia, and Vermont) do not have privileged communication 
statutes. 
Section 10 of the Mental Health and Developmental Diabilities 
Confidentiality Act (State of Illinois, 1981) stat~s that 
Except as provide~ herein, in any ~~vil, criminal, administrative, 
or legislative proceeding, or in arty proceeding preliminary ther-
eto, a recipient, and a therapist on behalf and in the interest of 
the recipient, has the privilege to refuse to disclose and to pre-
vent the disclosu~e of the recipient's record or communications. 
The exceptions to this privilege are: 
(1) where the client introduces his mental condition 
as an element of his claim or defense, only where 
the court decides that it is relevant and admissible. 
The Act further states that ... 
Except in a criminal proceeding in which the recipient, who is 
accused in that proceeding, raises the defense of insanity, no 
record or communication between a therapist and a recipient shall 
be deemed relevant for purposes of this subsection, except the 
fact of treatment, the cost of services and the ultimate diagnosis 
unless the party seeking disclosure of the communication clearly 
establishes in the trial court a compelling need for its produc-
tion. 
(2) When a claim is being filed by a client for injury caused in the 
course of providing services. The therapist may disclose records and 
communications to his attorney. 
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(3) Records and communications made to or by a therapist during the 
course of a court-ordered examination. provided that the recipient 
... "has been adequately and as effectively as possible informed before 
submitting to such (an) examination that ... " what will be talked about 
will not be considered confidential or privileged. 
(4) disclosure can be made of communications which determined a rei-
pient's competency or need for guardianship. 
(5) "Records and communications may be disclosed when such are made 
during treatment which the recipient is ordered to undergo to render 
him fit to stand trial on a cri~inal charge, provided that the disclo-
sure is mad~ only W\~h respect to the issue of fitness to stand trial'' 
(p.11). 
(6) R~cords and communications may be disclosed when a therapist 
determines that disclosure is necessary to initiate or continue civil 
commitment proceedings, or to otherwise " ... protect the recipient or 
other person against a clear, imminent risk of serious physical or 
mental injury or disease or death being inflicted upon the recipient, 
or by the reipient on himself or another .... " (p.12). In the course 
of providing services, a therapist may disclose a record or communuca-
tions without consent to: 
(1) the therapist's supervisor or consulting therapist .... (p.8). (2) 
an attorney or advocate consulted by the therapist. 
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Within the state of Pennsylvania, the provisions and exceptions 
to privilege are not spelled out in such detail as that found in Illi-
nois. Section 5944 of Title 42 Pa.C.S.A. reads: 
No person who has been licensed under the act of March 23, 1972 
(P.L.136, No.52), to practice psychology shall be, without the 
written consent of the client, examined in any civil or criminal 
matter as to any information acquired in the course of his profes-
sional services in behalf of such client. The confidential rela-
tions and communications between a psychologist and his client 
shall be on the same basis as those provided or prescribed by law 
between attorney and client. 
Section 5928 of this same title 42 specifies what the confidential 
relationship is between attorney and client. Essentially it says that 
an attorney shall not be required, and is not permitted to disclose 
.'lnything said to him by his client unless the client waives this 
right. 
The statute on privilege in Georgia is short and straightfor-
ward. l.t reads: 
confidential relations and communications between licensed applied 
psychologist and client are placed upon the same basis as those 
provided.by law between attorney and client (84-3118). 
A licensed applied psychologists is defined as a person of good moral 
character who is a U.S. citizen who holds a doctoral degree in psy-
chology (or a closely related field) and who has atleast one year of 
post-doctoral experience. 
Vermont was one of the states which did not have privilege com-
munication at the time that this survey was constructed. In section 
7103 of Title 18 Ch. 171, "Disclosure of Information," all clinical 
information relating to a client is to be kept confidential and not 
disclosed to anyone except when: 
(1) the client grants written consent to release information. 
122 
(2) " ... as a court may direct upon its determination that disclosure 
is necessary for the conduct of proceedings before it and that failure 
to make disclosure would be contrary to the public interest" (p.76). 
Most recently, however (Vermont Statutes Annotated, 1983), psycholo-
gist-patient privilege was established. The only exception to this 
privilege which was specified was a clause which allowed the patient 
to waive privilege should he/she desire to do so. 
The \vest Virginia Code (Volume 9, Chapter 27, 3-1) defines a 
confidential communication as including: the fact that a person has 
been or is presently a client, all diagnoses and opinions, mental or 
emotional condition, any advice, instructions, prescriptions etc. 
Confidential information may be disclosed when: 
(1) conducting an examination for involuntary commitment, 
(2) "pursuant to an order of any court based upon. a finding that said 
information is sufficiently relevant to a proceeding before the court 
to outweigh the importance of maintaining the confidentiality estab-
lished by this section." 
(3) to protect against a clear and substantial danger of imminent 
injury by apatient or client to himself or another, and 
(4) for treatment or internal review purposes to the staff of the men-
tal health facility where the patient is being cared for or to other 
health professionals involved in the treatment of the patient. 
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Although privilege communication exists for some professionals 
in Iowa (attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon, minister or priest) 
privilege did not exist for clinical psychologists during ~he time 
that this survey was constructed. While the statute itself never made 
this explicit, this decision had been held up in case law (In re Mar-
riage of Gaumer, 1981, 303 N.W.2d 136). More recently mental health 
professionals (which includes psychologists) were granted privilege on 
the same basis as attorney-client (Iowa Code Annotated, 1983-1984). 
The only exceptions to this privilege to be mentioned specifically are 
as follows: if the client wishes to waive privilege, or if the client 
is using his/her mental condition as an element of a claim cr defense. 
Within the state of South Carolina (title 44, chapter 23, arti-
cle 1090) all records are to be kept confidential and shall not be 
disclosed except inso far as: (1) the cient or patient grants consent, 
(2) "A court may direct, upon its determination that disclosure is 
necessary for the conduct of proceedings before it and that failure to 
make such disclosures would be contrary to the public interest" 
(p.531), (3) in order to cooperate with state and federal agencies, 
(4) in order to cooperate with law enforcement agencies, and (5) when 
the public safety is involved. In this latter case, disclosure may be 
made to the commissioner of mental health. 
Other portions of the law concerning confidentiality are found 
in other statutes. In statute 44-17-130, it is stated that information 
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received by the Department of Mental Health shall not be disclosed 
publicly unless ordered to do so by a court of "competent jurisdic-
tion" (p.435). Statute 44-21-230 says that any person, hospital, or 
organization can file clinical information about clients or patients 
with the Department of Mental Health related to the'' ... condition and 
treatment of any person." All of these records will remain confiden-
tial except when the client waives confidentiality, or under a court 
subpoena. Privilege does exist in South Carolina according to statute 
44-53-140 when treating a person for a drug problem. Treatment 
includes counseling or therapy. The only exceptions to privilege in 
this case are when the client waives privilege, or if the services a~e 
sought to enable the recepient to commit a crime or tort. Thus in 
South Carolina, privileged communication exists only when treating 
persons for drug problems. 
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THE SURVEY 
Below is a description of a clinical situation. Please read the 
description and respond to the following questions. 
An agency has referred a 25 year old man to you for individual psy-
chotherapy. You were told in the referral that this man has had trou-
ble in the past with impulses to harm others (himself). You agree to 
work this man. In his first session with you, he tries to tell you 
what is troubling him but stops himself and expresses a fear that if 
he is more explicit about w-hat these impuls.~s are, then you as the 
therapist might take some action against nim such as hospitalizing him 
or calling the police. 
1. How might you respond to such a situation? 
2. Speculate as to what the impact that a breach of confidentiality 
might have on the therapy at his time. 
Please use the following rating scale to answer questions about the 
vignette just described. Please circle your choice. 
1 2 3 4 5 
definitely 
would 
definitely 
would 
not 
3.1 would inform this man of the 
limits of confidentiality in this 
first session. 
4.1 ~auld try to reassure him that 
everything that is said in therap:y 
remains confidential. 
5.1 would not menticn confidentiality 
at first in the hopes that the client would 
be able to mention more specifically 
what it is that is troubling him. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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6.Has a clinical situation like the one just described ever happened 
to you during the course of your clinical work? ____ yes no 
if yes, briefly explain how you dealt with the limits of confiden-
tiality. 
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7. In your work as a psychologist, have you ever shared personal, 
identifying information about a client with anyone else without your 
client's consent (other than in routine situations such a~ filling 
out insurance forms, staffings, etc)? 
yes 
no (if not, go on to item 8). 
(a)If you did have to share such identifying information in the 
past, did it affect the outcome of therapy? ____ yes no. 
explain briefly -----------------------------------------------
The following group of items ask about what you typically say to an 
average client or patient when you see him(her) for a first therapy 
session. Please answer the folowing questions using the five point 
rating scale below. Please circle your choice. 
1 2 3 
Never Almost some-
never times 
8. From my first contact with a 
client, I inform them that 
everything that is said in 
4 
almost 
always 
5 
always 
1 2 3 4 5 
therapy remains confidential. 
I inform my clients from my first 
contact with them that : 
9. everything is confidential except 
when subpoenaed by a court of law. 
10. everything is confidential 
except when the client wishes 
to waive confidentiality. 
11.except when you the therapist 
feel that the client may be harmful 
to self ur others. 
12. I routinely mention something 
about confidentiality from my 
first contact with a patient. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please respond to item 13 or item 14 but not both. 
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13. If you u~ually inform clients about confidentiality from the out-
set of therapy, what do you usually tell them? 
14. If you do not usually inform clients from the outset, how do you 
handle confidentiality? 
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15.Has your position on confidentiality changed over the years? 
____ yes ____ no (if not, please go to item 16) 
(a)If yes, how has it changed? 
(b)Do you have any idens about rvhy it t.a<> changed? 
Here is a description of a different clinical situation. Please read 
the description and answer the questions that follow. 
"High functioning vignette" 
For three months now you have been treating a 35 year old woman 
who entered therapy following a recent divorce. It is your impression 
that she has functioned quite well psychologically throughout much of 
her life and is presently trying to adjust to her new roles as single 
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woman and single parent since the divorce. She has attended her ses-
sions regularly and seems to be making progress. Her ex-husband has 
just expressed his intention to take her to court in order ~o obtain 
custody of the children on the grounds that your client is an unfit 
parent. Your client fears that her ex-husband may use the fact that 
she is in therapy as evidence against her. She is concerned about 
continuing in therapy out of fear that it will leave the impression in 
court that she is emotionally unstable. During the course of the ses-
sion she also mentions that her husband intends to file for a subpoena 
in order to have you testify about your client's emotional stability. 
"Low functioning vignette" 
For three ~onths now you have been treating a 35 year old woman 
who entered therapy following a recent divorce. It is your impression 
that she has not functioned very well psychologically throughout most 
of her life .. She has a history of depression for which she has been 
hospitalized three times, the most recent of which followed a nearly 
fatal suicide attempt. Her present attempt to adjust to her new role 
of single woman and single woman since the divorce is but one of many 
"crises" which this woman has experienced. She has attended her ses-
sions regularly and seems to be making a little progress. Her ex-hus-
band has just expressed his intention to take her to court in order to 
obtain custody of the children on the grounds that your client is an 
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unfit parent. Your client fears that her ex-husband may use the fact 
that she is in therapy as evidence against her. Your client is con-
cerned about continuing in therapy out of fear that it will_-leave the 
impression in court that she is emotionally unstable. During the 
course of the session she also mentions that her husband intends to 
file for a subpoena in order to have you testify about your client's 
emotional stability. 
16. How might you handle this clinical situation? 
---------------------------------------------------------------
17. Has a situation like the above ever happened to you during the 
course of your clinical work? ____ yes ____ no 
Please use the following rating scale to answer questions about the 
clinical situation just described. 
1 
definitely 
would 
not 
2 3 4 5 
definitely 
would 
With respect to this vignette, would you: 
18.assure her that the law protects you 
from such a subpoena 
19.terminate with your client 
20. be in favor of testifying 
if requested to do so? 
21. Refuse to testify 
if she did not want you to 
22. consult with your lawyer 
about the best action 
to take. 
?.3. consult with a colleague 
about the best act. ion to take. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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24. Place an "x" next to the phrase which best completes the following 
sentence.: 
If a psychologist from your state were to be subpoeneaed in the 
clinical situation just described, he/she would: 
definitely have to testify 
probably have to testify 
probably not have to testify 
definitely not have to testify 
not sure 
25. Please read the following statement and place an "x" next to one 
of the five choices which best describes whether or not you agree with 
the statement. 
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I consider the therapy relationship to be the most critical ingredi-
ent in the process of treatment. 
strongly agree 
agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
disagree 
strongly disagree 
26. Define the following terms in the alloted space provided. 
Confidentiality: 
Privileged communication: 
Please indicate the conditions under which you would share confiden-
tial, identiiying information about a client in each of the following 
situations. Pick the one condition in each siutation which best 
describes your choice and record the condition number next to the cor-
responding situation. 
No. Condition: 
1. I would not share such information under 
any circumstance. 
2. I would share such information only with 
a client's complete consent and knowledge. 
3. I would share such information 
with a client's knowledge, but not 
necessarily with a client's consent. 
4. Neither a client's consent nor knowledge 
is necessary. 
Situations: 
27.You believe your client to be 
imminently dangerous to self or 
others. 
28. A concerned family member 
c0ntacts you for an explanation 
of why your adult client is 
having so many difficulties. 
29. Your client's employer 
contacts you for an explanation 
of why your client has missed 
so much work lately. 
30. You would like to consult 
with a colleague about certain 
troubling aspects of the therapy 
with your client. 
31. An insurance carrier contacts you 
and asks for a more detailed 
No. 
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explanation of your client's 
therapy in order to warrant 
further payment. 
32. You would like to contact 
a collection agency in an 
attempt to recover the money 
from an unpaid bill of a client 
who has recently left therapy. 
33.0n the average, how many patients/clients do you treat each year 
(on an outpatient basis?) whom you consider to be dangerous? 
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34. Is there privileged communication for professional psychologists 
in your state of practice? 
definitely is 
probably is 
not sure 
probably is not 
definitely is not 
Based on your understanding of your state law, please rate how legal 
it would be for you to share confidential, identifying information 
about your client in each of the following situations without your 
client's consent. Use the rating scale below and circle your choice 
for each item. 
1 2 3 4 5 
definitely 
illegal 
probably 
illegal 
not 
sure 
35.You believe that your client 
probably 
legal 
is imminently dangerous to self or 
others. 
36.A concerned family member 
contacts you for an explanation 
of why your client is having 
so many difficulties. 
37. Your client's employer 
co:n:acts you for an explanation 
of why your client has missed 
so m'lch work lately. 
3d.You would like to consult 
with a colleague about certain 
troubling aspects of the therapy 
with your client. 
39.An insurance carrier contacts you 
and asks for a more detailed 
explanation of your client's 
therapy in order to warrant 
further payment. 
40. You would like to contact 
a collection agency in an 
attempt to recover the money 
definitely 
legal 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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from an unpaid bill of a client 
who has recently left therapy. 
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41. What kind of impact does the privileged communication law for psy-
chologists in your state have on your clinical work? Please circle 
your choice. 
1 2 3 4 5 
very no very 
negative impact positive 
impact impact 
Comments: 
42. What would be your opinion about the presence of an ethical guide-
line which recommends that clients be informed in advance of the lim-
its of confidentiality? Please circle your choice. 
1 
strongly 
disapprove 
Comments: 
2 3 
neither 
approve 
nor disapprove 
4 5 
strongly 
approve 
43. Briefly, what is the policy of your institution 
concerning confidentiality? 
44.State in which you LUrrently work. 
45.Sex 
46.Are you a member of APA? yes no 
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47.Below is a list of possible settings in which you may be working. 
Please indicate the percentage of your time which you currently spend 
in each setting. Please be sure that the percentages total to 100. 
University I school 
inpatient psychiatric unit of a hospital 
or community mental health center 
outpatient clinic 
medical unit of a hospital 
private practice 
consultation 
counseling center 
other, specify---------------------
140 
48.0f the patients or clients that you see, indicate what percentages 
of these are adult, adolescent, or children. 
Adult 
Adolescent 
Child 
I am not seeing any clients or patients at 
the present time. 
49.Please indicate the approximate percentage of your clients or 
patients for whom substance abuse has been a major focus of treatment 
___ %. 
50 .Highest degree ean1ed 
in psychology: 
Ph.D. Psy.D. 
Ed.D. __ H ... L/H.S. 
B.A./B.S. 
other, specify __ _ 
Sl.Number of years of post-grad~ate experience 
52.Hajor field of graduate study 
Clini~al psychology 
Counseling psychology 
School psychology 
Community psychology 
Educational Psychology 
other, specify 
53.Check which one of the following best describes your predominant 
theoretical orientation. 
Adlerian Gestalt 
Behavioral 
____ Cognitive-behavioral 
Existential 
____ Family systems 
Person-centered 
Psychodynamic 
Rational Emotive 
Reality Therapy 
____ Eclectic(If you check eclectic, please rank 
order those orientations which contribute to 
your eclecticism in their order of importance). 
____ other, please specify--------------------------
54, How familiar are you with the Tarasoff decision? 
1 2 
not 
at all 
3 
not 
sure 
4 5 
very 
much 
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If you are familiar with this decision, does it have an impact on your 
clinical work? 
1 
very 
negative 
impact 
2 3 
no 
impact 
4 5 
very 
positive 
impact 
55.Below is a list of possible activities in which you may be engaged 
in each week. Please indicate the average number of hours that you 
spend in each activity per week. 
Individual psychotherapy 
Group psychotherapy 
Family therapy 
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__ Psychodiagnostic/neuropsychological testing 
APPENDIX C 
144 
THANK YOU / RE~1INDER POST CARDS 
First post card 
By now you should have received a copy of the questionnaire: 
Clinical Management of Confidentiality: A Survey of Professional Psy-
chologists. If you have already mailed in your completed question-
naire, I would like to thank you again for your participation. If you 
have not yet completed it, I would like to encourage you to do so. As 
I am sure you are aware, the quality of survey research increases for 
every additional questionnaire that is returned. Thank you for your 
h~lp. 
Second post card 
This is a second reminder for those of you who have still not 
sent in your questionnaire entitled: Clin{cal Management of Confiden-
tiality: A Survey of Professional Psychologists. I would greatly 
appreciate it if you could fill out and return the questionnaire as 
soon as possible. Thank you. 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Keith Baird has been read and 
approved by the following Committee: 
Dr. Patricia A. Rupert, Director 
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola University 
Dr. Eugene Kennedy 
Professor, Loyola University 
Dr. Roderick Pugh 
Professor, Loyola University 
The final c0pies have been examined by the Director of this 
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact 
that the disssertation is now given final approval by the Committee 
with reference to content and form. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
Date Director's Signature 
